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Abstract 
This thesis combines literary representation of hollow feminine bodies with 
contemporary cases of patriarchal authority over woman's bodies. Attorney General v. X 
[1992], a legal case reflected in O'Brien's Down by the River (1998), outlines control 
Irish courts hold over women (O'Reilly 131). Notions of feminine bodies as hollow, or as 
vessels for cultural, political, religious and filial meaning are long-standing. Their effects 
on female body identity are ultimately excessive. I outline how political and religious 
constructions divide experience by separating the feminine body from feminine identity. 
Aligning feminine insides with Ireland herself, the thesis illustrates entrenched ideologies 
of Irish feminine insecurity over possession of self and body. 
Ireland is an interesting case because inseparable politics and religion create 
unavoidable, violent, and forceful oppression of woman's agency. Colonization of 
femininity further perpetuates the repressive culture of gendered corporeality, and 
validates masculine authority's possession of bodies as vehicles for cultural transference. 
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Introduction 
".. .and here we see another phase in that 
oscillation which marks the relation of man to his 
female. He loves her to the extent that she is his, he 
fears her insofar as she remains the other; but it is as 
the fearsome other that he seeks to make her more 
profoundly his..." 
Simone de Beauvoir, 
The Second Sex 
The notion of the feminine body as a reproductive vessel is not new. In The 
Republic, Plato discusses legislating "more abundant permission to sleep with women, [in 
order] to have as many children as possible" (Grube 121). In The Second Sex, Simone de 
Beauvoir laments that woman is the vessel for the image of her male counterpart; "she is 
the mirror in which the male, Narcissus-like, contemplates himself: he bends over her in 
good or bad faith" (185). Rousseau writes that "the husband should have the right to 
oversee the conduct of his wife, because it is important for him to make certain that the 
children he is forced to acknowledge and raise belong to no one but himself (Ritter 59-
60). For Rousseau, a successful public economy is dependant on a private economy that 
dictates success through the birth of many children, "excluding [woman] from... 
primacy"; she loses power because of the hindering "indispositions peculiar to the 
woman" (59). Her role as the carrier of children debars her as a legitimate subject and 
authority, and she becomes simply a vessel for the production of family success, and the 
progression of the community. Mary Wollstonecraft points out that the "puritan 
reformers, good religious fundamentalists, encouraged submissiveness in women, 
passivity, dependence on men, limited education, a general containment and restriction of 
the 'weaker vessel'" (Wollstonecraft, Vindication xxxi). Freud suggests, among other 
offences, that women's bodies are endowed with characteristics that make "them 
tolerable as sexual objects" (954). In each of these diachronically diverse examples, the 
feminine body is reduced to a hollow vessel that holds no value save that which is 
garnered by its ability to produce children, or one that validates the existence or image of 
a related male; woman's body is a cultural carrying case for social meaning and identity 
construction as opposed to an element of humanity linked to an individual person. Her 
identity is gendered beyond her sex, and the female body becomes a possession not of the 
individual, but of the culture and family within which it exists. All of her roles within the 
community and the family revolve around the fact that she is female. 
With the feminine body so wound up in the politics of the family—childbirth is a 
major factor in the success and continuation of the family—and with the family 
representing the moral state of the larger community, women's corporeal autonomy is 
sacrificed. In Ireland, a country both deeply committed to its Catholic roots and 
motivated by its on-going struggle against colonization, feminine bodies suffer the 
consequences. Irish abortion history and legislation fortify the metaphorical regard of 
women's bodies as hollow and commodified. Even though there was no explicit 
constitutional prohibition against abortion—that is, the unborn foetus possessed no rights 
as an individual under the constitution—it has been a criminal offence prosecuted under 
the 1861 Offences Against the Person Act (Mullally 89). 
Northern Ireland possesses its own abortion issues. According to the Northern 
Ireland Abortion Law Reform Association, the Offences Against the Person Act only 
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offered exception in cases where a pregnant woman's life would be endangered by 
maintaining pregnancy, and this—initially provided for under England's 1929 Infant Life 
Preservation Act—only after the foetus reaches twenty-eight weeks of development. 
Under the amended 1861 Act, abortion during the first twenty-seven weeks of pregnancy 
is not provided for legally (Northern 41). In 1945, Britain extended the Infant Life 
Preservation Act to Northern Ireland creating a gap from conception to twenty-eight 
weeks where there is no legal provision on abortion. In 1967, England passed abortion 
laws for England, Scotland and Wales allowing abortions for both "social and medical 
reasons" yet excluded the colony of Northern Ireland (Northern 40). Ambiguities in the 
legal systems affecting both Eire (the Republic of Ireland) and Northern Ireland translate 
to abortion issues not only between the two states, but also the island as a whole. 
In 1983, however, amendments to the Irish Constitution's Article 40.3.3 granted 
the unborn foetus new rights to life (Mullally 89), resulting in an unconditional ban on 
abortion. In 1981, the development of the Pro-Life Amendment Campaign (PLAC) 
mainly by Catholic Right groups, had pushed for the amendment and continued their 
work to maintain the 1983 decision in order to protect the idea of Irish children from 
what they saw as the violent instruments of the British colonialists (90). According to 
Mullally, colonial activity pressured members of Irish communities to try to preserve the 
integrity of a sort of archetype of Irishness by resisting anything affiliated with or 
representational of the colonial English (90). Further augmenting the division of the 
already-split Irish population was the Protestant Church's opposition to the PLAC, 
arguing that upholding any law based upon the Catholic Right would be exclusionary and 
infringe upon the rights of Irish citizens of other faiths. Despite this internal civil conflict, 
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the success of the PLAC ultimately reached great heights for the protection of the unborn, 
and all at the expense of limitations upon "the scope of women's reproductive autonomy" 
(90). Anti-abortion groups overtook student groups and clinics, even demanding the 
prevention of the distribution of brochures and information on abortion outside of Ireland 
(90). The intensity of this activity led to High Court injunctions and the famous Protocol 
No. 17, designed to block any interference with constitutional abortion issues by the 
proposed Maastricht Treaty and Ireland's ensuing membership into the European Union 
(91-2). The Irish government drafted and passed Protocol No. 17 without parliamentary 
consultation, in order to protect Ireland's constitutional prohibition on abortion regardless 
of any laws governing the European Union (92). 
Edna O'Brien's Down by the River outlines Ireland's debates between pro-choice 
and anti-abortion activists, and is based on the 1992 case Attorney General v. X, in which 
the Supreme Court addressed the rights of a fourteen-year-old girl who was raped, 
became pregnant, and travelled to England for an abortion (Mullally 92). X's highly 
publicized case re-ignited the foetal rights debates of the early '80s, and similarly 
renewed dialogue surrounding maternal rights in terms of travel and control over female 
reproductive processes (O'Reilly 129-32). The Attorney General secured injunctions 
demanding X return to Ireland without her abortion, and additionally, limiting her ability 
to travel for a period of nine months (O'Reilly 126). According to Mullally, national and 
international debate raged over the conflicting rights of the mother and the rights of the 
unborn child (92). O'Reilly notes that Irish courts are responsible for protecting 
constitutional rights, but also that there are no laws in place to direct or guide the practice 
of rights guardianship particularly when two parties' rights are conflicting (131). The 
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objectification of the feminine body through the imposition of limitations on the women's 
rights contributes to the hollowing because the community dictates not only the use of the 
body for procreation, but also women's ability to partake in the decisions regarding that 
use. X is not autonomous because her culture forces her to remain in the space where her 
body is not under her own control. Ireland is X's prison. 
In O'Brien's novel, the tragedy of a young Irish girl whose father repeatedly rapes 
and consequently impregnates her encapsulates the hollow feminine. Social and religious 
regulating of bodies results in the individual body's loss of power. Removal of power or 
autonomy situates bodies in positions of vulnerability and exposure to manipulation by 
the other. O'Brien's hollowing is literal; in a rage, upon hearing of her pregnancy, James 
attacks Mary and attempts to empty her of the child with the broken end of a broomstick. 
The violence against her both during her rapes and with the broomstick represents the 
most intense moments when Mary MacNamara's hollow feminine body is used as a 
carrying case not for her own individual identity, but for that of family and country. The 
sovereign feminine entity—an individual who encompasses both her internal identity and 
her body—cannot exist because the political and religious economies do not permit 
feminine corporeal independence. Even though James's attack on Mary initially fails to 
destroy her baby, he is still attempting to claim the foetus as his own property. Through a 
lack of power and autonomy within the Irish religious and political situation, the hollow 
feminine remains a vessel to define meaning for the other, and as such exists in a 
gendered and ambiguous position that not only demands, but also creates, individual 
anonymity. Even amidst extensive media attention, Mary is anonymous, functional only 
to the degree that she symbolizes the homogeneous female body and the extreme 
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expectations upon her. Mary's name is not even her own because upon publicity of her 
case, the media refer to her only as Magdalene (O'Brien 186), who is also a contradictory 
feminine symbol of "lust, loyalty, belief, prostitution, repentance, beauty, madness, [and] 
sainthood" (Schaberg 81). With both public attention and anonymity, Mary transforms, in 
the eyes of her community, into a random feminine body, devoid of definitive humanity, 
and open to be both possession and disgrace to her father and to her country. 
Highly political and religious debate over a woman's right to choose abortion, and 
as such maintain her own reproductive autonomy, reflects the interference of church and 
state upon women's rights. In order to perpetrate the control of reproduction—significant 
in a society with long-standing national insecurity and ambiguous identity ensuing from 
the remnants of colonial status—women, reduced by church and state to the symbols of 
femininity, emerge as identity-lacking bodies. Relating the body politic and the body 
religious back to these corporeal symbols of femininity establishes an economy of 
woman's sacrifice for the greater good of the community. National myth building and 
inconsistencies subsequent to the transition from pagan to Christian belief further the 
reification of the feminine body for cultural purposes. In Down by the River, the 
corporeal feminine exists empty of individual identity. As such, their possessive 
masculine counterparts discount both metaphorical and literal violence towards women as 
a safeguard for the moral systems of the culture. 
According to Dana Hearne, the equation of women's issues with national issues in 
Ireland "is a deeply entrenched gender ideology" (110) that dates back to pre-
Independence. She argues that pre-Independence Irish thought placed feminism as "anti-
nationalist and a foreign import" (110) that unnecessarily progressed the colonial project. 
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Hearne notes that "radical feminist thinkers" embraced the problematic separation 
between the domestic and the public spheres, and disregarded the very Irish-national 
ideal that the "home was not a sphere apart but was inextricably bound up with the larger 
community" (100). Further stifling for women, there is the culturally ingrained belief that 
the greater needs of the ailing nation, under the confines of colonialism, are forever 
privileged over gender oppression and the actual needs or ambition of women (86). 
Compounding this oppression is the Irish dependence on a misogynistic Catholic Church 
as a marker separating Irish national identity from an imperial British identity. However, 
aligning women with the feminine nation may have the potential of addressing long-
violated women's rights concerns. Yet, perhaps this potential has seldom, if ever been 
realized to correct these violations. Patrick Keane suggests that this sort of long-standing 
equation between woman and country effectively situates the country as a feminine body 
and creates a sense of ambiguity over an individual's motivation or intention: 
When one's nation is personified as beloved, mother, and muse— 
Dana, Eire, Erin, Fotla, Banba, Dark Rosaleen, the Shan Van Vocht, 
Cathleen ni Houlihan—she is a necessarily ambiguous figure: a triple 
goddess at once creative and destructive, benevolent and malign, nurturing 
and devouring. (7) 
Because of this constructed ambiguity, the individual—or the nation—loses her own 
agency, and becomes open to every form of interpretation, judgment and control. Just as 
Ireland has been colonized and controlled, so is Mary as she awaits the judges' decisions 
regarding her body and her fate. 
According to Jeanette Shumaker, O'Brien often illustrates the notion of the 
sacrificial woman or the emulated martyrdom of "the suffering virgin" (185). She 
suggests that Irish women in particular strive to emulate the Madonna myth in which one 
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is either "a nun... a wife, mother, or 'fallen woman'" (185). Shumaker attributes this 
desire to emulate the Virgin Mary to a common Irish feminine "loathing for her body" as 
an "inherently evil possession for which [she] must compensate" (186). The myth 
perpetuates culture's perception and use of woman as a sexual commodity (186) and 
epitomizes the contradictory notion of the untouched body of the mother. O'Brien 
positions Mary simultaneously as active in her quest not to be a mother and as less active 
than those engaging in the act of virgin emulation. Her father denies her the role of virgin 
and she resists the socially expected role of mother for non-virgins. Regardless of her 
attempts for abortion and her hesitation to repent, Mary is perhaps more Madonna than 
the disesteemed Magdalene—both O'Brien's Mary and Magdalene lost their social status 
in their communities—because the constructs act upon her body, just like the Virgin 
Mary, who is not afforded consent for the conception of her child by the ultimate 
religious authority. The masculine power uses her body as a vessel to the point of 
becoming fully the object, and as such, diminishing her agency. O'Brien never allows 
Mary to give in and speak the truth; she is never provided—by O'Brien—the opportunity 
to give her father up to the authorities, even at their own urging. Her only real moment of 
testimony is her letter to Luke that is not fully truthful, and never reaches him in time to 
allow him to help her (O'Brien 98). Her letter is a confession and an appeal for help. 
Mary's confession in the letter and the consequences for Luke are hazy. Upon his 
arrest, Luke provides the guards with the letter, but after his release he cries and O'Brien 
tells us: "He cannot yet bring himself to say that he is crying not for what they had done 
to him, but for what he did by letting them read the girl's letter, and in the doing sullied 
himself (177). He perceives that Mary "had done him wrong" (177), but the letter 
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functions to exonerate him of the baby's paternity. Her request for a place to hide from 
the authorities, or her inference that she will visit a doctor—perhaps for termination of 
the pregnancy—may implicate him, but he never actually takes on the role of accomplice 
to provide her sanctuary. His placement of blame as sullying him is confusing; O'Brien is 
unclear if Luke's subconscious regret over exposing the letter is a result of his letting 
Mary down, or alternatively, of his feelings that she did so to him. O'Brien's use of 
ambiguity perhaps functions to assist the transformations of power, and in the 
transferences of power between individuals. Power may play out in the covert spaces 
improperly defined by the 'other', and as such, perceptions of the 'other' from either side 
are ultimately ambiguous. 
Additionally, through extensive media attention, Mary transforms further into 
myth. She is, for the country, at once a symbol for "the suffering Irish female condition in 
general" (Shumaker 188) and for the notion that "woman as a sexual being is a 
monster... [with] inborn flaws" (192), as defined by the anti-abortion activists. O'Brien's 
use of ambiguous pronouns forces a state of confusion regarding the female character 
involved in any given situation. This lack of clarity of character creates a sense of 
anonymity for O'Brien's female characters. Women and their bodies are homogenized to 
the degree that all women are preserved or professed within a certain aura of the random 
female or hollow body. As a possession, female individuality, or internal identity does 
not really matter because of this placed inhumanity. When Mary's mother Bridget dies, 
O'Brien provides barely enough information to place her at her own death. The dead 
woman is anonymous at the moment of her death and ultimately could have been any of 
the women in the hospital ward (51). Bridget's death hollows her body, and results in the 
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loss of her feminine cultural potential rather than the loss of her individual existence. 
The parallel between childbirth and death is prominent in the text. O'Brien often 
remarks on the mother / child relationships of beasts of burden: a "cow... demented 
because her calf had been taken away that morning" (28), the near death of a horse during 
birth, and the subsequent calling of the newborn foal, villain, by Mary's father (62-3) 
articulate not only the obvious link between mother and child, but also the close parallel 
between birth and death. There is a process of connection at separation, or at this moment 
of hollowing. Even Mary, during her extreme violation, is "cut off from every place else, 
and her body too, the knowing part of her body getting separated from what was 
happening down there" (4) because she experiences simultaneous connection and 
separation. The feminine entity splits into its parts and the internal identity disconnects 
from the body. Aligning the relationship of birth and death, and human mother and child 
with animals not only furthers the project of de-humanizing and de-individualizing 
women and their bodies, but also represents the death of the potential of cultural 
transference from mother to child. The biological role of the mother has played out, yet 
her role as cultural conveyor can be filled by any homogenized maternal figure. 
Bridget's death forces Mary to become an object that contributes to both Irish 
patriarchal family structure and to the conflict over the right to abortion. Mary epitomizes 
family and state desire for the "control of women's sexuality, specifically in relation to 
reproductive issues and rights through the abortion debate" (Hearne 85-6). Mary's 
identity is consumed. Her body, as a sort of contradiction to pregnancy, is hollowed of 
subjectivity, replacing her individuality with the superstitious disgrace attributed to the 
feminine body by church and state. O'Brien illustrates disgrace upon traditionally 
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innocent female characters; a newborn infant, Mary, and Betty, a woman who has 
suffered numerous miscarriages, are all objects of an implied or attributed disgrace. Mary 
speculates that her baby sister "who only survived a few days... was buried in a grave a 
long ways off, as if there were some disgrace attached to her" (60). Similarly, after James 
attacks Mary with the broomstick, he "pulled the thing out and holding it at arm's length 
like some poisonous totem he went off to bury it" (106). Disgrace functions to shed light 
upon superstitions of femininity as impure within the patriarchal culture. O'Brien 
connects the baby and the broomstick when they are both buried in order to weaken the 
poison they carry. Burying these so-called products of disgrace suggests the colonizing 
process creates disgrace to further dis-empower feminine potential and to progress the 
patriarchal control over women's sexual and reproductive activity. The literal burying of 
identifying elements of femininity reflects a symbolic burying or hiding, by the 
patriarchal system, of feminine identity and taboo. Through the creation of superstitions, 
feminine bodies become vessels for disgrace, and women bear the weight of the 
subsequent punishment decreed by family or community. Betty Crowe's inability to 
conceive or to carry a viable baby to term also places her within the sphere of superstition 
and disgrace. If a feminine body's only purpose is to bear children in order to strengthen 
the family, and ultimately, the community, then a barren woman falls not only outside the 
reproductive system, but also outside of the culture's productive system. She has no place 
within a family and as such no cultural place either. In this childless situation, Betty 
reverts back to the virginal role. Betty's husband dies in order for Betty to be once again 
sexless; his continued existence would imply that Betty participates in sexual activity not 
resulting in the conception of children. She is, perhaps, punished with the death of her 
11 
husband because of being unable to provide children that would contribute to the 
perpetuation of the social order. 
The body plays a significant role in the application of discipline. Discipline 
functions not only to punish individuals for stepping outside of boundaries, but also to 
create the very boundaries in which to contain the individuals. In Down by the River, 
penal boundaries govern, but imprinted upon the legal system are the cultural and 
religious boundaries that shape and influence that governance. The feminine body is a 
boundary in itself. Bodies must be—according to Foucault—either restricted, in terms of 
imprisonment, and subjected to other forms of physical constraint, or bodily alteration in 
terms of torture or even death. "The body... is caught up in a system of constraints and 
privations, obligations and prohibitions" (Foucault, Discipline 11). The body becomes the 
only site of punishment, regardless of the penal sentence, and because of the structure of 
the system, the restrained body itself—or the human within that body—loses its agency 
over the implications of punishment. The body is locked up—restrained as imprisoned, or 
constrained by social demand—to avoid being used as a tool for crime, suggesting an 
immense separation between physical body and internal identity. Foucault represents this 
lack of agency with a lack of liberty in which elements such as "rationing of food, sexual 
deprivation, corporal punishment, [and] solitary confinement" are a part (16). The courts 
sanction Mary to remain in Ireland for the duration of her pregnancy. The rulings against 
her are limits on her physical body and her right to freedom of movement. Foucault 
suggests that even in contemporary societies where bodily torture itself is condemned as 
inhumane, "there remains... a trace of 'torture'" inherent in all punishment (16), in which 
the body suffers the punishment through "an economy of suspended rights" (11). 
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Foucault's concept of a trace of torture leads him to the notion of the tortured soul 
over the tortured body, and that imprisonment is more so a torture of the mind than 
necessarily pain infliction upon the body. "The expiation that once rained down upon the 
body must be replaced by a punishment that acts in depth on the heart, the thoughts, the 
will, the inclinations" to the point of "converting a soul" (16). O'Brien's women all exist 
on a daily basis within this Foucauldian notion of a trace of torture because they are the 
targets of a patriarchal economy of suspended rights. Woman's femininity is her prison 
and her punishment. In order for the Irish state to enforce its political and religious 
imperatives upon the population, woman herself must be placed into a state of ongoing 
restriction and punishment. Her crime, indeed, is solely her feminine body. 
When Foucault writes of the body of the condemned, he suggests the body plays 
such a role because "the body... [is] the only property accessible" (25) on which to assert 
any power: 
This political investment of the body is bound up, in accordance with 
complex reciprocal relations, with its economic use; it is largely as a force 
for production that the body is invested with relations of power and 
domination; but, on the other hand, its constitution as a labour power is 
possible only if it is caught up in a system of subjection (in which need is 
also a political instrument meticulously prepared, calculated and used); the 
body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a 
subjected body. {Discipline 25-6) 
Of course, this dual function privileges societal obligations over any sense of individual 
accord. The goal is this political investment, and, according to Foucault, there must be a 
level of secrecy: "the preliminary investigation was carried out 'as diligently and 
secretively as may be'" (35) only to be later made visible. In this case the system 
functions to create tensions that at once restrict all access to the feminine body, but still 
demand that the same body be targeted as a primary source for social, religious, and 
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penal construction of meaning. The elements of the paradigm exist as ingrained within 
the culture and govern the relationships between masculine and feminine bodies to the 
degree that they appear not to exist at all. Mary's own attempt at any form of physical 
agency deteriorates to the point that she "was trying to have no body, to elude it" 
(O'Brien 34). 
The negation of the feminine entity—the sort of primordial unity between the 
integrity of the feminine body and the internal self s identity—represents an inherent flaw 
in the ways in which political and religious systems are able to appropriate the unique 
physical capabilities of the feminine body. Irish systems are particularly oppressive as 
evidenced not only by the nation's long history of debate over abortion and women's 
reproductive rights, but also by the degree of intensity of that debate. Subsequently, a 
society that unconditionally prohibits abortion, enacts legislation that restricts travel for 
pregnant women seeking abortions, and sacrifices the mother for the possible good of the 
unborn is one that treats the feminine body as a vessel for cultural preservation and 
vitality. Entrenched ideologies resist change and, as such, feminine bodies become the 
fundamental element for valuing woman and contribute to the homogenizing and de-
humanizing processes that oppress her. 
14 
1 
Hollowing the Feminine Body: 
The Madonna Myth and the Feminine Trinity 
To see the feminine body as hollow is at the least objectifying, but the act of 
aggressively hollowing the body for the purpose of social, cultural, and political attache 
is fundamentally violent. Religiously concocted myth normalizes and actualizes the 
reification of woman to facilitate the use and control of her reproductive elements for 
social benefit. Removing or taking possession of the feminine insides detaches the 
individual from her body and consequently limits her control and agency over the 
physical processes her body naturally allows her. Cultural and social regulation concern 
female reproductive rights, yet are created by this imaginary dissection between a 
woman's internal self and her body. In Down by the River, feminine characters suffer 
great loss of self-government and sovereignty because of patriarchal and religious acts of 
hollowing. Attacks on the female body are physically violent. Removing entrenched 
ideologies from the collective mindset is difficult, and as such, social belief systems 
become psychologically and emotionally acculturating. In Ireland, the social expectation 
for women to meet impossible standards of a religiously constructed Madonna Myth or 
Feminine Trinity compounds feminine identity conflicts. 
The frenzied and brutal attack on Mary's pregnant body at the hands of her father 
foregrounds the lack of patriarchal regard for the feminine body. He begins with a 
physical assault and kicks her "recklessly" (O'Brien 105). Mary remembers a similar 
beating on her mother, in the same spot, as if upon her mother's death Mary's own body 
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replaces Bridget's body. For James, Mary's body contains the impurity of the other man, 
"the tinker," on whom he knowingly misplaces blame for Mary's pregnancy (105). He 
demands her obedience and orders her upstairs where "he will de-fuck that bastard out of 
her" (105). James's belief he can remove the sexual act and its possible products from her 
body illustrates his subconscious subscription to the patriarchal ideal of the feminine 
body as a carrying case from which social elements may be simply packed or un-packed. 
His violence with the broken broomstick plays out on her body as if she were a non-
human object. Even Mary "believes the implement was going right through her and out 
the crown of her head, like the chimney sweeper's brush but bloodied instead of sooted" 
(106). He thrusts the broomstick and makes certain "to push it inside and wind and re-
wind" till Mary "could hear her insides slushing, like an over-full bucket" (106). She 
relates the pain to her entire being as "all wound, only wound" to the point where "[she] 
lay there, half gone, her mind a semi-nothingness" after the violence subsided (106). She 
feels "the madness [pass] from him then and into her" (106) through the broomstick, as if 
he somehow violently bestows upon her body his patriarchal beliefs and by doing so, 
condemns her internal belief paradigm to conflict with social expectation. 
Attempting to exist within a system based on the needs and experiences of the 
'other' generates for women, an incompatible gulf between self and society. In "A 
Sadistic Farce," Ailbhe Smyth suggests that Irish women have been reduced, by 
patriarchal legal language and structure, "to a half-life, or have disappeared out of life 
altogether" (9) and that "[w]omen's bodies, women's right to bodily integrity, [and] 
women's freedom to control... [their own] reproductive processes are caught in an 
impenetrable, materially meaningless web of male-generated words" (7-8). Mary feels 
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after her first rape that she "half-died" (O'Brien 4). The violence against her physical 
body alters her existence and becomes the moment of her awareness of social and cultural 
dissection between her body and her self. The sanctioned and systemic patriarchal control 
over a woman's body and her reproductive elements—in terms of both personal violence, 
and legal and religious infliction—removes all sense of her body as her own. She 
becomes essentially an object whose body belongs not to herself, but to the state, or a 
religious or filial community. The transference of her insides leaves her hollow; she is 
nothing more than a vessel to implement the reproductive needs and desires of the 
patriarchal community within which she exists. Her autonomy is thus sacrificed for the 
perpetuation of the community's existing system, culture, and structure. 
O'Brien introduces the notion of the hollow body with an episode in which Sister 
Aquinas, a female symbol for Ireland's repressive and possessive religion, takes hold of a 
found ladybird and declares: "It's lucky... It's ours" (48). O'Brien suggests that Aquinas 
believes that she has actually saved the ladybird from being "prey to every kind of 
disease, [and from] predators searching for a weak spot in her armour, finding it, tapping 
a hole, and later... getting in there and eating [her] from within" (47). She subscribes to 
the notion of a natural or God-directed hierarchy of power. Just as "women lose their 
independent lives and are deprived of their civil status" (Smyth 9), the ladybird is 
similarly, and justly displaced when Aquinas "[with] a rubber spatula... gently eases [the 
ladybird] off [of her skirt] and puts it on Mary's lap..."; the labybird then becomes "taut, 
prehensive, probably alarmed at being shifted from one body to another" (O'Brien 47). 
The possession and placement of the body of the ladybird mirrors the dangers inherent 
for feminine bodies in this text. Mary's body, too, is in danger of being hollowed as 
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Aquinas dictates social placement and responsibility. She even warns Mary that should 
the ladybird die from lack of "the juices of leaves or flowers," which Mary may or may 
not be able to provide, she will be punished: "Til make a hole in your armour and then 
I'll eat you from inside'" (48). Mary becomes the vessel responsible for the life of the 
ladybird, and Aquinas grants Mary no freedom from the demands of nourishing mother 
because the role has been pronounced from above. The patriarchal 'other' prescribes 
feminine roles and diverts the feminine entity from her internal identifying project. 
It is perhaps not coincidental that O'Brien chose the name Aquinas for Mary's 
muse because of the influential theological teachings of Thomas Aquinas. The 
Dominican friar used philosophy, and the work of other philosophers, to provide "an 
exhilarating cosmological, metaphysical and epistemological framework on which to 
build a coherent and all-encompassing Christian worldview" (Cahn 407). According to 
Cahn, critics charge Thomas Aquinas with insisting upon the idea of natural knowledge, 
and either rejecting or disregarding any "philosophy that conflicted with Christian 
revelation" (407). Aquinas also suggests that God made women solely for reproduction 
because other men provide men with spiritual growth (Isherwood 75). According to 
Judith Ann Johnson, Augustine and, later Aquinas, believed that "woman's only ordained 
purpose was to give birth" (Johnson 206). O'Brien also includes Augustine as a professor 
to whom Mary is innocently attracted, yet who has his own sexual secrets. The professor 
refuses board at the MacNamara home to maintain his apartment above a shop where 
every night an unknown "succubus... [ministers] to him while he [sleeps]" (7-8). His 
unwavering commitment to an unknown woman symbolizes his own disregard for 
individuality and his preference for an ambiguous feminine body. Alternatively, Mary's 
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head master, and the teacher that Tara's mother confronts regarding Mary's pregnancy is 
surprisingly sensitive and sympathetic to Mary's condition. His behaviour and concern 
for her are contradictory to the patristic idea that women are automatically guilty of 
fleshly conflicts. He is determined that Mary is innocent and places blame first on a 
cousin or an uncle (150), and then on himself for not being able to protect her properly. 
The head teacher takes responsibility for Mary's fall; his perception that he possesses a 
right to protect her places him as the paternal authority, and Mary as the powerless 
feminine child in need of governance. He emerges as the masculine power expected to 
preserve Mary's innocence and encourage her potential to emulate the Virgin Mary. 
The glorification of goddess figures by religious powers and the subsequent 
social demand for women to emulate these goddesses alters gender power structures and 
negates to some degree both corporeal and interior identity. In "Why Do Men Need the 
Goddess? Male Creation of Female Religious Symbols," Rosemary Radford Ruether 
demonstrates how "[female] images and symbols for the divine that have been 
constructed by men actually empower themselves, often at the expense of women" (234). 
She suggests these powerful female symbols become a sort of replacement or proxy for 
actual women and function for men—particularly for celibate priests—to "exclude the 
carnal temptations of fleshly women" (235). Ruether writes: 
Catholic Christianity elaborated a rich imagery of Mary as immaculately 
conceived, fit pure vessel of the sinless Christ, Mother of Christians in 
whom we are reborn from our sinful birth from our sexual mothers, 
incorrupt in death, ascending into heaven to be crowned Queen of Heaven 
by Christ and God the Father. But this Marian symbolism is problematic 
for Christian women. 'Our tainted nature's solitary boast' sets Mary as 
virgin mother against all real women who may be one or the other, but 
never both at the same time. All women are tempted by their fleshly 
natures in ways that Mary was not. (my emphasis 235) 
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Religious authority's setting up the symbol to which all Christian women should aspire as 
a pure vessel, while simultaneously constructing real women as impure, contributes to not 
only the oppositional dyad between genders, but also for women, an impossible identity 
to which to conform. In The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir argues that the patriarchal 
system has created of woman a myth in which she is required to exist on one side of a 
constructed binary (255). Within the gender construction proper there is a privileged 
masculine side and a marginalized feminine side. Elements on each side of the binary are 
developed according to the paternal needs of the culture, which ultimately "even 
authorizes [the] abuse" of feminine identities (255). De Beauvior states this binary is 
static (253). Yet, also on the feminine side are tributaries or perhaps more accurately, 
distributaries flowing in and out inflicting pressures and contributing to the main 
construction of gender identity. Contrary to this inert state of social identity, women's 
internal identities are fluid, acted upon by their life experiences and situations, and as 
such, women cannot perform their identities adequately within the binds of the binary. 
Irreconcilable differences in the gap between internal identities and social 
expectations signal the resulting conflict of the feminine myth. De Beauvoir asserts that 
"a fundamental ambiguity marks the feminine being" and that "her body does not seem to 
her to be a clear expression of herself (257). The dynamic of the binary opposition 
attributes to woman the notion of the Eternal Feminine (253), but the duplicity of the 
eternal feminine creates an unavoidable ambiguity regarding the myth of woman, or the 
mystery of woman (256). De Beauvoir argues woman is potentially monster or mother, 
and in this way, women are created, not born, and "everything happens to women 
through the agency of others" (606). This tension between the myth of the mother and the 
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myth of the monster thus constructs woman, as not only discordant to her internal 
identity, but also delimited to be either maternal or destructive. In the case of Irish 
women, whose identities paradigmatically connect with myths of national identity, 
colonial and patriotic expectations further advance the feminine myth. So, according to 
de Beauvoir, woman is disguised "as a symbol" (261), and although she can "in sexuality 
and maternity.. .claim autonomy... to be a 'true woman' she must ultimately accept 
herself as the Other" (262). 
The division from the 'other' and the hollowing process result in a denial of not 
only agency, but also of the opportunity for self-governance and even self-awareness. 
When the paradigm of possession is so deeply entrenched, and often propagated through 
generations, any form of retaliation or revolution becomes not only so much less feasible, 
but even so much less conceivable. Even women marginalized by their hollow bodies buy 
into the patriarchal entrenchment and may fail to see their own oppression as it exists 
around them. On the afternoon of her death, Bridget remembers: "as a girl [being]... sent 
to buy a loaf, and so warm and so tempting did it smell that she made a hole in it and 
began to pick out the bits of warm dough, bit after bit, until there was nothing left, only 
an empty well-baked shell" (O'Brien 50). In this case, Bridget privileges the inside over 
the shell when she says there is nothing left; there remains, however, the shell, but she 
devalues it as inconsequential. 
Bridget's own death experience links her back to the cycle of life and death: "the 
water begins to issue from her, a great cataractic gush, as if the placenta has broken and a 
child is coming out... [and] the body heaving, sinking down down onto the floor" (51). 
Bridget's body is emptied, and lowered closer to the Earth, and O'Brien restricts that 
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which is coming out to water, blood, or a child. The water gushes out, and her body is 
lifeless; the case is once again empty and inconsequential. So while the physical 
hollowing of the body must occur to render the body as culturally productive, the dead 
and hollow body has effectively lost its ability for production or procreation and is thus 
culturally useless. For cultural use, however, the feminine body must be hollowed and 
repacked by masculine representatives of the patriarchal system. Bridget's death hollows 
her, but leaves her devalued because the hollowing is independent from cultural 
interference and her dead body is useless for cultural application. 
O'Brien's use of water symbolism is extensive, but requisite. Water is the symbol 
of "eternal renewal" and is the "original element" ("Water") that connects the cycles of 
all life and death, and the earth and heavens. By linking water and woman so closely, 
particularly at moments of birth, death, trauma, or redemption, O'Brien reconnects the 
divorced relationship between woman and her social, cultural, spiritual, or terrestrial 
environment. The connection overturns the common patriarchal equation between woman 
and impurity. The fluidity of water suggests a certain level of cleansing, purity, or 
regeneration free from stagnation and capable of participating in nature's most important 
cycles. Affiliating woman and water re-places woman into a space that is not necessarily 
impure and, as such, releases her from the essentialist ideals that disallow her personal 
identity construction. Furthermore, a feminine inside may represent the possibility of 
emancipation from social constructs if the water is actually coming directly from the 
body. Water inside the feminine body suggests a fluid interior, rather than the fixed 
identity placed by church and state. H.R. Ellis Davidson suggests early pagan religions 
often linked sacred places involving water with the notion of creation. She outlines how 
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these places, near rivers, wells, or lakes, provided ready access to "communication with 
the gods," which "extended both upwards and downwards" (25). The "depths of earth" 
(25) and the purity of this water bring "inspiration and knowledge" (26). Davidson also 
equates early pagan fertility gods and goddesses as "linked with earth and sea" (105). 
Similar Irish traditions mix water and blood imagery to represent a messaging system 
from the gods outlining specific destinies for individuals within the legends: "Again she 
waded into the sea and brought down the axe, and this time there was a loud crash and 
the water seemed stained with blood" (152). The image of moving water or waves 
transmits the divine message, and when mixed with blood represents a new-found 
knowledge of pre-destined events. Davidson also suggests communication with the gods 
is heightened when the devotee prays near water and that the practice "seems to have 
continued in Christian tradition" (152). According to Davidson, giving gifts to the water 
results in knowledge and inspiration (26), but applying the water to an individual—such 
as during baptismal rites—functions to purify from either Original or earthly sin (Dresen 
147). 
Masculine and feminine figures alike are subject to cultural stereotypes regarding 
corporeal value. However, in order continually to privilege the masculine, the feminine 
body and its products experience extreme devaluation and shame. In "The Body as a 
Lived Metaphor," Tom Greenwood describes a '"horrifying misogyny' in which the 
dualistic framework—that associates the woman with the body, the body with suffering, 
and suffering with salvation—is used as a criterion for women's salvation" (64). In 
"Shedding Blood," Judith Ann Johnson writes, "in Western religious traditions, the 
release of blood (or body fluids) from a woman has too often been identified with 
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impurity and shame, [and] with a type of contaminated or desecrated nature" (190). 
Johnson continues by arguing that equivalent fluid release from men "is aligned with 
redemption and honor [sic]" (190) that translates into the maintenance of "a 'pure' 
descent line" (191). James's contradictory behaviour—his relentless concern for the 
sanctity of his bloodline held up against his common practice of raping his daughter— 
alludes to the notion of male privilege "as an expression of a divinely sanctioned male 
sovereignty over life and death" (193), and the idea of using "male fluid to create life and 
female blood to contaminate it" (192). Even Mary subscribes to the notion of male fluid 
for creation or redemption; while staying with Luke, 
She thought that if he were to kiss her it would be like an enchantment or 
that even if he were to bend down and she were to feel the condensation 
from his lips falling onto hers that it would be a transport from the old and 
awful life, like the moment in a fairy tale when a person is released from 
damnation. (O'Brien 94-5) 
Luke's body, and subsequently, the fluids his body produces, are sites of redemption and 
re-purification. Conversely, Mary's body is an inherent carrier of sin and impurity. Tara's 
mother "exclaims at the thought of that harlot sleeping in Tara's room, sharing Tara's 
bed, infecting her with sin and vileness" (O'Brien 146). Mary's body carries the cultural 
and social elements representative of religious constructions of evil, as if sin and vileness 
are physically transmitted. 
Because the natural cycle of life includes death, the process of birth in Down by 
the River is inextricably linked to death. When Mary attempts suicide, she ruminates that 
the "way to do it was not to jump but to sit on the steepest bit of bank and slide down, to 
think of it as being plunged into a big bath of water, or a font, a baptism font with no 
floor to it" (108-9). O'Brien not only places the moment of death within a cultural rite of 
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birth, a Catholic baptism, but also alludes loosely to an image of birth. The process of 
sliding down conjures images of a child moving through and leaving the birth canal; the 
baby leaves the feminine inside, and is immediately plunged into the suffocating and 
bottomless cultural constructs of society and religion. Religious expectations of the 
maternal feminine simultaneously bind a child to woman, and extract any notion of an 
internal feminine self. Just as violently as the demented cow whose calf is taken from her, 
Mary is forced to keep her child with her. Regardless of the direction of the child—away 
from the mother, or towards her in forced possession—an influence other than the 
individual woman is acting on the mother / child relationship. 
O'Brien often illustrates the empty body or shell as insignificant. Yet, the hollow 
feminine body is far from such disqualification. However, in this case, the body is only 
worthwhile if it is emptied and re-filled with the demanded characteristics of the 
patriarchal status quo by the privileged authority. Who hollows and who re-packs the 
body with meaning is of consequence; Mary is not authorized to determine or create her 
autonomous identity because the political or religious patriarchate controls feminine 
social placement. O'Brien represents Mary's lack of control over her 'self when she 
suffers an intense nosebleed. Mary has been "emptied of all that blood" (O'Brien 36). 
And later O'Brien describes Mary's mind as "cold. Like a little skull. And like a skull, 
empty of everything" (85). Mary asserts: '"I will not put myself together again. It is 
broken now. That which was is gone'" (85). The removing of her feminine inside leaves 
only an empty casing that is devoid of power. The loss of Mary's blood seems to 
represent what Davidson calls "a sign of impending slaughter" (152). Here, the 
metaphorical slaughter or dissection of the feminine body without resulting death leads 
25 
instead to arrested agency. At this point, there is only the insignificant body remaining; so 
by eliminating the inside, the 'other' possesses and controls the outside to the degree that 
the individual has a drastically altered view of herself. O'Brien's women lose agency 
because their insides are inherently dismantled, expunged or modified by the 'other'. The 
loss is permanent and irreversible; just as the virgin's hymen can never be regained once 
altered by the masculine 'other', the hollowed body is perpetually broken apart and 
irretrievable. 
Yet, regardless of her illustrations of permanent and irreversible modifications on 
feminine identity, O'Brien does provide hope for regeneration and for the restoration of 
the denigrated feminine. She applies Gaelic tradition by drawing on tales of pagan myth 
describing the Washer at the Ford as representative of not only impending slaughter or 
battle defeat, but also of fecundity, fertility, and sovereignty (Green, Goddesses 41). The 
washer, often in possession of the male war hero's weapons, symbolizes one part of a 
goddess triad combining "destruction, sexuality and prophecy" (42). Similarly, the triple 
goddess also links to the Fates, who spin, measure and cut the life-thread ("Thread"), 
giving a feminine entity authority over death, which is the power completely denied 
women under Christianity. While the Washer at the Ford is a figure of strength, her 
power leads male warriors to "insane savagery born of fear [and] panic" (42-3). Feminine 
power functions against the so-called good of the community and leads to death and 
destruction rather as opposed to male power, which creates instead of destroying life. The 
washer thus is an emblem not only of a hero's passing from Earthly life to the Otherworld 
(42), but also of a general sense of being "poised between two worlds" (77). Green 
argues one washer, Macha, was represented as a human queen, but linked with 
26 
supernatural powers and "sovereignty in all its aspects" (77). Macha's downfall—a result 
of dying in childbirth after her husband's hubris forces her to race the king's horses 
regardless of her being pregnant—is viewed by some scholars as the event of the 
"overthrowing by men of female domination" (77); according to the tale, she won the 
race but her exertions induced labour and "she died giving birth to twins" (77). Davidson 
also writes of Irish folkloric tales describing "a woman by a river washing the spoils of 
battle, the limbs of the slain, or garments taken from the dead" (99) and that such images 
represent prophecy (152), or sexuality and fertility (Green Goddesses 11). Green's 
Morrigan has "intercourse with the Daghda while straddling a stream" (77). The image of 
Mary after the first encounter with her abusive father mirrors the image of the Washer at 
the Ford; O'Brien writes: 
Everything is drying, coagulating. It is a plasma. She will wash in the 
river, wash and rewash and pleat herself back together. She will throw the 
knickers far away down in the fairy fort... An image floated up then to 
startle her, something she had once seen and thought of as being quite 
harmless; it was a cake at a party which seemed to be uncut but when she 
brought her face up close to it, every piece had been severed, every 
severed piece, side by side, a wicked decoy. (5) 
Mary's prophecy is the cake, which represents her body, with its intact appearance, but 
divided reality. The self is divided and conflicted with the body. Mary's activity at the 
river both physically cleanses her and attempts to re-purify symbolically, but also harkens 
to the rituals of early pagan offerings of valuables into the water to appease the gods. 
Mary's offerings, perhaps normally associated with little value or even shame—her 
feminine bodily fluids or undergarments—are re-valued outside of the usual patriarchal 
hierarchy of value. Mary's power or ability to increase the value of these things portrays 
her disregard of the accepted structures and systems that de-value anything feminine. 
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Water itself contains properties that contribute to a sort of re-valuation or 
restoration through purification. In Celtic Myths, Green writes, water was "perceived as 
both a creator and a destroyer of life" and agrees that the "sanctity and symbolism of 
water continued into the Christian tradition" (51). The "[springs] and wells were 
associated with divinities and especially with cults of healing," and the goddess Brigit 
was closely associated with wells, water, and the depths of the earth (53). The fact that 
the pagan goddess, Brigit, transfers into Christianity as a Saint suggests the value of her 
sacred character and divine power. Green argues, "[bogs] were the centre of important 
cult activity, not only because of their watery nature but also perhaps because of the 
element of danger and treachery associated with them" (52-3). O'Brien places James and 
Mary in the bog during Mary's violation. However, he is, just before his indiscretion, 
actually in the process of taking from the water, rather than partaking in the traditional 
practice of sacrificing to, or giving to the water as a rite of respect and servitude to the 
gods: 
He struck out with it then waved and dandled it to verify both his powers 
and the riches which had lain so long, prone and concealed, waiting for the 
thrust of the slane. He fished in one bog hole, then the next, hooking on 
green scum and a frail cress with tiny white fibres, which he placed at her 
feet. (O'Brien 2) 
The crime takes place in the bog, a place of cult activity as opposed to religious rites, but 
as noted earlier, the re-purification takes place at the river. The contradictory nature of 
water being both good and evil is a common theme in terms of the Irish appropriation of 
the Madonna Myth and the feminine trinity of virgin, mother, or whore. 
Green suggests that because most Celtic societies were primarily rural, they 
naturally placed their preoccupations "with the seasons and with the fertility and well-
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being of their crops and livestock" {Myths 54). As such, most of the related divinities 
"function as providers of fertility" (54). The mother goddesses, being so close to the 
earth, "most clearly display the concept of the personification of fertility" and more often 
than not appear as a triad: "This triplism seems to occur most frequently in the imagery of 
divine beings associated with prosperity and well-being" (54). According to Green, the 
triplism may represent various stages of womanhood (54), and possibly illustrates the 
progression from a young virgin, to motherhood, to old age. In Celtic Goddesses: 
Warriors, Virgins and Mothers, Green postulates that virginity and the associated "sexual 
intensity of the virgin" equate to representations of "a goddess of sovereignty," which 
links "sexuality, fertility, territory and war which is evident in the personae of the Irish 
goddesses" (63). Green argues that violations of virgins and the loss of innocence may 
"represent a catastrophic upheaval, whereby humankind had to cultivate the land in order 
to survive, and to endure hardship, war and death" (64). Both the feminine body and the 
land are violated and raped to ensure the survival of the community. The loss of virginity 
thus results in human mortality and the loss of divine sanctity. Green summarizes the 
symbolism of the goddesses as "explicable in terms of an association between the 
darkness of death with that of the earth and the womb" {Goddesses 41). 
Similar debate over the pious status of the Virgin Mary exists in certain 
theological fields. In her book Mary—The Feminine Face of the Church, Rosemary 
Radford Ruether suggests some studies of Mariology insist that Mary's privileged 
religious rank depends upon her remaining a virgin throughout her entire life (54-5). Her 
virginity is determined by the existence of an intact hymen. As such, the Virgin Mary's 
physical body is the determining factor for the judgement of her spirituality, her divinity, 
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and her closeness to God. The hymen is also relevant to consider as a sort of egress to the 
hollow feminine body; it functions not only to speak for the chastity and virtue of its 
owner, but also represents an obstruction of the portal to the feminine inside, perhaps 
functioning as a barrier to maintain what is inside. It is at once inside and outside the 
body. But, in "Transforming Feminine Categories: Genealogies of Virginity and 
Sainthood," Stiritz and Schiller point out that the hymen itself is shrouded in myth: "The 
membrane that is associated with defloration evokes in the imagination a cover, but is 
anatomically not a seal but a crescent-shaped fold of mucous membrane" and cannot be 
physically "lost" or "destroyed" (1140). The presence or absence of this mythical hymen 
defines the ability of the body to be symbolically or imaginatively used, manipulated, and 
filled-up for social purposes. The patriarchal creation of the hymen allows for social and 
cultural dominance based upon an imaginary symbol of purity, innocence, and chastity 
needed to secure patriarchal control. Even if the hymen is imaginary, patriarchy has used 
it to create a physical phenomenon that falsely represents certain values of the individual. 
Just as society permits patriarchal myth to create the feminine body imaginatively, 
so too does it allow the Church to define roles demanded of women. Ruether describes 
how the Virgin Mary is "historically mother of Christ, but like the church, also the 
daughter and bride of Christ" (53). Here, the ambiguity and confusion of woman's roles 
are historical and quite primary concerns. Problematic to feminine creation of 'self is 
Catholicism's disregard for an actual feminine selfhood outside the Church's definition. 
According to Ruether, church officials easily ignored this conflict and demanded that 
woman maintain her belief and faith in Christ and the Church in spite of this "confusion 
of symbolic sexual relations" (53). Of course, a constructed conflict or confusion 
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disallows for solid identity markers that define one's place or position in society. If the 
very basis for women's identifying roles is ambiguous, and particularly because these 
roles are founded in myth, women live simultaneously with guilt—for the essential 
crimes of womanhood—and in what Angela West calls "the distorted images" that 
exclude women from social and spiritual reality (208). 
Many of these ambiguous and contradictory roles have translated into Christianity 
from pagan traditions. In Celtic Goddesses, Green addresses the stories of the Mabinogi 
and how some of the tales relate to Irish myth, or how some characters are "cognates" of 
Irish gods and goddesses (58). She describes how women were somewhat empowered in 
that they possessed various capital rights and could choose between a domestic life— 
however still dependant on a husband, father, or brother—or a holy calling, but if 
choosing the latter, they would still be subordinate to a male god figure (26). She 
suggests unless a woman was "specifically divine" (26), she would be generally 
dominated by men. According to Green, virginity was "obligatory for girls embarking on 
their first marriage" (26), but that the word for "virginity, morwyn, has more than one 
meaning" (58). Notions of rape and incest are common in pre-Christian Irish lore, and 
Green even suggests a "birth as a result of incest could be a sign of divinity" (58). Green 
refers to the story of Arianrhod who immaculately conceives twin boys as she steps over 
Math's magical staff. An important element in the story addresses the possibility that the 
father of Arianrhod's sons is actually her own brother, Gwydion. Gwydion takes on one 
son to raise as his own; the other son is lost as he slips into the sea (57). The tale sets 
Arianrhod in inconsistent and contradictory feminine roles. She is both virgin and mother 
because her sons are conceived without sexual activity, and in one Mabinogi translation 
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she is considered the original virgin footholder of Math (58); she is both sister and wife to 
her brother because he is the father of her children; she is earthly—with human 
embodiment—and divine in that the children born to her of an incestuous relationship are 
divine. Arianrhod may also have been considered an ancestor-goddess, or, with Branwen 
and Rhiannon, formed a goddess triad as a sky-deity (59). 
Often social and religious myth creation defining women's roles produces limited 
options and interchangeability between female individuals. Jeanette Shumaker suggests 
not only that there "is no place in the conceptual architecture of Christian society for a 
single woman who is neither a virgin nor a whore" (194-5), but also that the "Madonna 
myth takes different forms, from becoming a nun to becoming a wife, mother, or 'fallen 
woman'" (185). Any identity construction outside of these options is unavailable and 
unattainable. Patrick Keane agrees, and suggests that the function of this feminine myth 
reaches beyond even the female citizenry of Ireland, but also to "mother Ireland" herself 
(1). The stringent link between religious and state praxis creates "the conditions that 
often made women domineering" (Keane xv). In Terrible Beauty, Keane argues that he 
has "tried to communicate a consciousness of the 'less attractive implications' of both 
'Woman-as-Muse' and Woman-as-Mother Ireland, the old woman who, transformed into 
the young girl with the walk of a queen, lures men to their graves" (xvi). Not unlike the 
mutable pagan goddesses, O'Brien's Mary takes the place of her mother, Bridget, by 
taking on her sexual and domestic role as wife to James. She also consequently becomes 
mother to his unborn child. In this case, Bridget is the old woman transformed into the 
young girl. Yet, it is Betty, barren and widowed, to whom O'Brien's Dr Tom says: "You 
still hold yourself up with the walk of a queen" (117). Additionally, the mystery 
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surrounding the death of Betty's husband—perhaps a suicide inspired by the couple's 
inability to produce children—may also represent the fatal female characteristic of luring 
a man to his death. 
Many Irish authors portray notions of supernatural female transformations, which 
perhaps contribute to the mythical ideals of women in contradictory roles. Moreover, 
because women generally bear the weight of reproductive and child-rearing 
responsibilities, their identities from individual to parent transform more than men's 
roles. According to Keane, writers such as W.B. Yeats, James Joyce, and Padraig Pearse 
represent woman "at the height of her beauty, [transformed] into a half-mad old Irish 
crone" symbolizing "the dark, destructive side of the Great Mother" (15). Keane outlines 
the progression of the stories as the transformation from "the Old Woman" luring the 
young men to battle with promises of ever-lasting remembrance as "martyr-heroes" to "a 
young girl with the walk of a queen" (16). The goddesses' insatiable need for blood links 
these ideas of Cathleen ni Houlihan, the Morrigu, Morrigan (Green, Goddesses 41-5), 
Kali as the death-goddess Kalika, and Caillech or old Woman (Keane 17) as coexistent 
signs of "fertility and destruction" (Green, Goddesses 41). Green writes: 
The character of these goddesses is complex and apparently ambiguous. 
What is clear is that fertility and destruction are equally important and are 
interdependent. The symbolism may be explicable in terms of an 
association between the darkness of death with that of the earth and the 
womb. Thus the apparent absence of life when the seed lies germinating in 
the dark soil may have been perceived as analogous to the death of 
warriors on the battlefield and their rebirth in the happy Otherworld. 
{Goddesses 41) 
As such, even wartime deaths are attributed to the feminine physical body. The devouring 
female—both goddess and mother Ireland—carries responsibility for the lost and 
honourable blood of the masculine population. Her body is the catalyst for the state of 
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sovereignty and for the impossible regeneration of a pure national identity. Even de 
Beauvoir suggests woman is "depicted as the Praying Mantis, the Mandrake, the 
Demon... [or else] the Muse, [or] Goddess Mother" (254). Woman is a monster because 
based on the system of privilege determined by the patriarchate she is unnatural, and 
allocated status only as a mythical creature. 
To base actual existences in myth creates some obvious tensions in terms of both 
individual and national identity building. In Postnationalist Ireland: Politics, Culture, 
Philosophy, Richard Kearney explains how "[foundational] myths disclose the original 
meaning of tradition... [and] defy the normal logic of either-/or by conflating not only 
opposite time-scales, but also such opposed orders as living and dead, divine and human, 
redeemed and damned" (109). According to Kearney, the foundational myth offers 
alternatives to conflicted socio-political issues of the society, but "since the remedy is 
lacking in reality, the community finds itself unable to fulfil its desires of sovereignty and 
so begins to ... 'project them into the imaginary'" (109). The era in which the myth is 
created as foundational, and the era in which the myth is applied practically to the 
community are incompatible. Thus, the myth operates "as a scapegoating mechanism... 
[that sacrifices] the victim, on whom the evils of society are projected... as a means of 
purging and restoring the community to unity" (109). Kearney argues that Irish sacrifice 
is a product of "a 'sacred' memory of death and renewal which provided legitimation for 
present acts of suffering by grafting them onto paradigms of a recurring past" (110). For 
Ireland, as a nation, sacrifice becomes the main element of identity. 
So, when Keane aligns Irish women with national Irish identity, he ultimately 
parallels the historical and mythical sacrifice of the nation with the necessary sacrifice of 
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modern women. Giving in to patriarchal and religious oppression, as O'Brien's women 
do, is justified, expected and unquestioned; they are martyrs because they not only allow 
themselves to be sacrificed, but also need to be sacrificed, in order to submit to and fulfil 
their historical national identity. As does Keane, Kearney recognizes the link between 
modern Irish women and the Virgin Mary. He writes: "Is it possible that such idealized 
imagos of womanhood might be related to the social stereotypes of the Irish woman as 
pure virgin or son-obsessed mother?" (118-9). So, just as Ireland calls forth the blood of 
her sons to resurrect the national identity of Ireland from "centuries of historical 
persecution," women must accept their role as providing sons to Ireland for that very 
political purpose (118). O'Brien's women, however, have not given birth to sons, but 
daughters, or have been unsuccessful at maintaining pregnancy altogether, thus 
diminishing any political purpose of woman. Kearney suggests this form of diminishment 
is an attempt to "repossess an identity in the imaginary" because of colonization: 
In the historical evolution of Irish religious ideology, we witness a shift 
away from the early Irish church which was quite liberal in sexual matters 
and assigned an important role to women, to a more puritanical religion 
which idealized women as other-worldly creatures of sublime innocence. 
And it is perhaps no accident that this shift coincided in some measure 
with the colonization of Ireland. (119) 
Kearney continues that the colonization process shifted the national ideology of "Ireland 
from a fatherland... into idioms connoting a motherland" (119). Equating woman with a 
newly-demoted national identity functions primarily to justify both her oppression and 
maintain her repression. O'Brien's Mary becomes what Kearney might suggest of all 
Irish women: 
the passive daughter seems to assume the more militant guise of a mother 
goddess summoning her faithful sons to rise up against the infidel invader 
so that, through the shedding of their blood, she might be redeemed from 
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colonial violation and become pure once again — restored to her pristine 
sovereignty of land, language and liturgy. (120) 
Any widespread internalized notions that redemption and restoration on both national and 
personal levels are necessary for women act as a sort of reminder that women are, 
because of their fertile bodies, impure or contaminated. In "The Old Rite of the 
Churching of Women after Childbirth," Susan K. Roll suggests certain historical and 
religious practices were "intended precisely as a ritual purification, as if something 
contaminating and ungodly had occurred in pregnancy and childbirth" (117). She argues 
many ancient customs would exclude both the new mother and the midwife from 
participating in worship services for a certain amount of time—longer if the child was 
born female—"which implies that [they had] been contaminated by contact with the 
blood and the placenta" (120). Women who suffered abortion or miscarriage partake in 
similar, yet slightly altered purification rituals. Roll also suggests that the bodies of 
women who died during childbirth risked "desanctifying the church building due to the 
flow of blood" (128) and in such cases "another woman underwent the churching as a 
substitute or proxy for the deceased woman" (128-9). This "underlying motif of 
renunciation of evil conduct and of purification" equates with the Feast of the 
Purification of the Virgin Mary, which, according to Roll, is the "model for what pious 
Catholic women were expected, if not legally compelled to do" (132). She cites one 
specifically Irish explanation for the ritual as though "its roots are still to be found in the 
need to purify the woman... [and that the] initiative for this rite is ascribed, or perhaps 
projected onto, women themselves: 'A desire of imitating this humility of the Blessed 
Virgin'" (134). 
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The feminine body is once again a tool for the masculine maintenance of religious 
and political power. Moreover, feminine acceptance of and participation in this 
purification ritual act, as Greitje Dresen suggests, "as a sign of fidelity to priestly rule" 
(146). She argues purification rituals and baptismal customs are representative rebirths 
that symbolically appropriate women's labour (148). The work of the feminine body 
must be not only re-worked, but also reversed. The products of the body's labour and the 
body itself must be cleansed. The reified feminine body is a machine refurbished by the 
church and only after rehabilitation is reintroduced to the community as less impure and 
less godless than directly following labour and delivery. The feminine population 
maintains no power, no agency, no autonomy, and no individuality. The feminine body 
itself is symbolically all women. There is no differentiation between women; the 
feminine body is archetypal. 
Further complicating this interchangeability of feminine characters is male 
suicide, or alleged suicide. James' suicide is obvious (O'Brien 249); even though Betty 
asserts that her husband's death was accidental, there are still rumours he intentionally 
drowned himself (110-11). At this point, which specific woman, who carries the "fatal 
power of the Female" (Keane xii) luring men to their graves, is inconsequential because 
all women are encapsulated within this female trinity of virgin / mother / whore, and no 
one individual woman is granted emancipation from it. The demands upon the archetypal 
female dictate both women's roles in the family and the function of their biological 
bodies as maternal. Male suicides are responses to the shame brought on by inadequate 
female members of the families. Moreover, all social implication of deviation falls on the 
family because the only status held by women derives from the domestic sphere. In 
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Shattering Silence, Begona Aretxaga argues that "the imposition of Catholic social 
policies [was] fundamentally restrictive in matters of gender and sexuality" (149) and led 
to enormous consequences for women "who were erased from the professional and 
intellectual life of the country" (150). This process allows "a domestic structure that 
emphasize[s] male control and female domesticity" as constituting "civilized life" (T. 
Hunt 50), but which consumes all feminine identity within marriage (Shumaker 190) or 
religious service. Compromising a woman's reproductive role within the family, as with 
both O'Brien's Betty and Mary, disrupts roles throughout the family and ultimately 
reflects upon the masculine family head. A husband's or father's inability to control the 
production capabilities of his family usurps his power. 
Shumaker argues, "the alternatives to marriage for women in Ireland rarely go 
beyond the brothel or the convent" because women "act masochistically to pay for the 
evil they perceive as inherent to their female bodies" (196). According to Shumaker, "the 
nun emulates the Madonna" (187). O'Brien's Mary, in her somewhat awkward role at the 
convent, is also placed as the soon-to-be carrier of the 'Father's' child. Shumaker 
suggests, "the demand for virginity enforces the punishment of the rebellious 'fallen 
woman,' whereas it restricts the life experience of the well-disciplined nun" (196). Mary 
MacNamara attempts to use the convention to her benefit as she strives to distance herself 
from her own body. She views her body and parts of her body as "an enemy" (O'Brien 
29), or even "substanceless" (83), further separating her body from her self. Because the 
general feminine body is the site for all female cultural implication, the body itself also 
represents the "inescapability of patriarchal power, whether in the home or the convent" 
(Shumaker 188). The placement of the body into a political institution—the home or the 
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convent—is of little consequence; the body itself is the institution upon which all other 
institutional power structures are played out because "both sides of the Madonna ideal— 
Virgin and mother—are identically submissive" (187). 
After examining Mary, Dr Tom says to Betty: "Rosaries and ovaries, I don't 
know which does the most damage to this country. And to me" (O'Brien 116). Dr Tom's 
lament acknowledges how both woman and religion infringe upon his own existence. He 
gives no primacy to the feminine body; he treats the feminine body as if it were, like 
religion, a cultural rather than physical entity, created or invented after the fact of male 
physical creation. The feminine state is marginalized to the degree that it cannot exist 
without breaching the male privilege. His concern for damage to the country, and to 
himself, represents not only a masculine disregard for Mary's situation, but his statement 
implies that ovaries are generally more of a social or cultural ill than physical elements of 
a living person. Ovaries are the metonymy replacing the entire woman—body and soul— 
with one basic physical and identifying component. But, if taken at face value, Dr Tom's 
comment further commodities and separates woman's body from the individual within. 
Her body is the possession of her family, her father, and even the community. When 
Mary screams for Dr Tom not to examine her, he concedes only because he "can't 
examine [her] without [her] father's permission" (116). It is not Mary's preference that 
dictates the doctor's actions, but rather an existing patriarchal agreement that removes 
power and possession from the "weak, helpless woman" (T. Hunt 55) who is "unfit to 
rule" her own body (57). 
In The History of Sexuality, Foucault writes, "at the juncture of the 'body' and the 
'population,' sex [is] a crucial target of a power organized around the management of life 
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rather than the menace of death" (147). He suggests that the "blood relation long 
remained an important element in the mechanisms of power, its manifestations and its 
rituals" because sex addresses power "to the body, to life, to what causes it to proliferate, 
to what reinforces the species, its stamina, is ability to dominate, or its capacity for being 
used" (147). So for Foucault, like Rousseau before him, "the vitality of the social body" 
(Foucault, History 147) is in part dependent upon the exclusion of woman from primacy 
in order to maintain large families (Ritter 59). Women are sacrificed for the perpetuation 
of the bloodline and the continued success of their male counterparts through their ability 
to bear them strong children. The continued marginalization and objectification of 
woman is necessary because sexuality for the purposes of reproduction inherently 
possesses two physical sides—male and female—and because "power [speaks] of 
sexuality and to sexuality" (Foucault, History 147). A feminine body is representative 
only of its reproductive capability; one of Tara's brochures reads: "The hymen which 
partly blocks the vagina is the gift wrapping proving that the product is untouched" 
(O'Brien 147), confirming the importance of maintaining the purity of the commodity. 
But does a quality such as virginity even truly exist? Hanne Blank, in the very 
first line of Virgin: The Untouched History, suggests it does not. She argues there is no 
"material reckoning" that virginity exists, and that culture invented and developed the 
idea "as an integral part of how we experience our own bodies and selves" (3). Virginity 
in all its possible forms is nothing more than another myth designed to aid in the control 
of feminine production in a masculine dominated society. Blank suggests even the 
hymen—the sole physical element for determining a woman's virginity—is historically 
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shrouded in conjecture and assumption as if the little bit of flesh does not really exist in 
its known form after all (Blank 52). Stiritz and Schiller argue: 
Notions of virginity as an unblemished state, the first penetration by a 
penis as an irrevocable transformation into womanhood, and defloration as 
a developmental milestone in female sexuality derive from male fantasies 
of female purity that translate into justifications for social structures of 
control and ownership. (1133) 
In this manner, images of woman have been split between "idealizations and 
demonizations" and have been organized around "fantasies of purity and perfection" 
(1134). They say that the only way for a girl to develop into a woman is to be imposed 
upon sexually by a man; thus patriarchy invented virginity and its associated virtuous and 
pious elements to serve its cultural and power needs (1136). The scholars suggest "a 
woman values her virginity because it belongs to someone else—to God or, 
unconsciously, her father" (1135). Mary's devastation over her violation may represent 
not only the physical imposition of her rape and incest, but also the cultural weight 
resulting from the fact that her virginity, and by extension, her body, really have become 
possessions of her father. The problem is, though, that if either male—God or her 
father—actually claims her body, the social implications are immense. This contradiction 
progresses cultural use of the feminine trinity by disallowing a legitimate and practical 
female corporeal existence. Even considering the complex relationships of the Virgin 
Mary, in which she is "often characterized as an icon of the patriarchy, [and]... as a 
figure of feminine transcendence" (1149), the Virgin exists as a by-product of male 
interference. 
The notion of transcendence, either intentionally or accidentally, indicates a state 
of non-corporeality or physicality; both ideas and representations of the body and the 
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actual body cannot exist within the available environment. For O'Brien's Mary, the body 
becomes something both perceived, and acted upon, by her male society. Mary is 
incapable of not transcending her body because her body never really belonged to her, 
and the manner in which her body is defined does not correspond with its physical reality. 
It is in this way that Mary is completely subjugated, all the while transcending her 
corporeal binds. Women must transcend corporeality simply to exist in a male-defined 
body. According to Sallie McFague, the "proper function of trinitarianism in the 
Christian tradition is... to preserve for agential theism both radical immanence and 
radical transcendence" (192). O'Brien's Mary is the daughter, the mother, the violated 
virgin; she is invisible—her body is substanceless—but because embodied by the media, 
she encompasses all of Ireland's knowledge. 
The very thing that a patriarchal family head would avoid is for his bloodline to 
be weakened. The family is the commodity or possession that provides its male head with 
power. Yet, ironically in O'Brien's text, it is James, the male head of the family, who 
risks the bloodline. As mentioned earlier, James's violent imposition upon Mary opens up 
the possibility for hereditary deviation, yet the very mention of it sends him into a fury: 
'What freak?' he said, foaming now, gesticulating, pointing to have his 
jacket and his hairbrush handed to him, protesting before God that there 
would be no freaks in his family, in his bloodline, and those who spoke 
such calumnies would swing for it. (O'Brien 192) 
James's lack of awareness of his responsibility for his role in the creation of a possibly 
mutated child implies his complete subscription to a patriarchal right of possession of 
Mary. O'Brien emphasizes James's belief in his right to possess Mary by aligning the 
notion of the baby with his demand for the mundane possessions of his jacket and his 
hairbrush. Further, his transference of responsibility to Mary also suggests his belief of 
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masculine privilege and feminine guilt, even though, he is the one who ultimately swings 
for it. 
However, in a small chapter called "Bridget," O'Brien raises questions regarding 
Mary's paternity. Bridget's contemplative mood leaves her conflicted and resigned to her 
fate. O'Brien hints that Bridget may know about James's violent indiscretions, but also 
that James may not be Mary's father after all: 
With approaching death there comes questions and recollection. The little 
pod called her life. Girlhood. School. Her wedding. Speeches. Her 
wedding night. Giving birth. And those visits, those lawless visits that she 
lived for. Knew his stuff he did, with his stethoscope and his ample 
hatching hand. She lived for those visits, monthly they were. He knew 
when to come, knew when a woman was ripe, must have gleaned it from 
his medical lore. (O'Brien 37) 
Of course, this revelation creates a number of implications. If James is not Mary's father, 
then privileging the violence of rape over the taboo of incest returns agency and self-
possession to a woman and her body. Her body is now something that possesses rights for 
its own sovereignty and protection rather than a cultural object to violate. If the violence 
against the body is more important than a cultural taboo, then individual women 
experience possession of their own bodies rather than relinquishing power to the 
normally generalizing culture. The feminine body is, in this case, privileged over 
masculine possession of the body. Another implication is that it is now unlikely for a 
freak baby to be born because the bloodline broke before James and Mary's union. 
However, as a result of this sexual relationship, questions regarding possession versus the 
appearance of possession must still be addressed from a colonial standpoint in which the 
possessors' rights are at stake. The implication is such that possession is not an essential 
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element of masculinity, but that possession of the feminine body emerges from the ability 
to exert power. 
Blending elements of power between the sexes and possible lingering colonial 
relationships creates a system of hierarchies that elevates the masculine and negates the 
feminine. According to Tamara Hunt, "the colonial allegory" dictates that "the feminine 
Irish [need] to be controlled by the masculine English" in order to encourage and 
maintain a satisfactory level of civilization (52). O'Brien places James in contradiction 
because the family depends on Bridget's selling of eggs at the market to "[combat] their 
poverty" (O'Brien 60). Yet, James still attempts to embrace his privileged masculinity 
even though he is emasculated by Bridget's financial contributions. The family's 
economic success revolves around women's labour and the products of that work rather 
than masculine success in the public sphere. Bridget's contribution of eggs 
metaphorically reflects the economic and cultural products of the feminine body, which 
once outside of the domestic sphere become valuable contributions to the public 
economy.1 Contrary to expected roles, however, at the auction mart, James "does not 
have anything to sell but he goes anyhow [because] he likes to be among the men" 
(O'Brien 86). He reinforces his rightful place in the "man's world" (86), but fails to live 
up to his responsibilities as provider. The notion of right—general or individual—is 
gendered because James, though not contributing to this masculine economy, excludes 
Mary as having "no right" to enter the mart (86). Thus, the physical male body carries 
rights over individual merit and contributes to a disregard of a meritorious feminine self 
I would like to thank Dr. Kristen Guest for pointing out the metaphorical link between 
the economic and cultural value of a woman's reproductive egg and the eggs Bridget sells 
at the market. 
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in the colonial or patriarchal hierarchy. Regardless of individual worthiness, social rights 
are granted primarily to masculine bodies. However, even the notion of emasculation 
automatically generates concerns. Assuming masculine properties inherent to all men that 
can somehow be culturally removed from them creates exactly the same problematic 
gender dynamic as the hollow feminine. 
If Ireland is aligned with the idea of woman, then she too becomes inherently 
hollow, and capable only as carrier for the masculine other. When Smyth suggests, '"the 
state is convulsed, with us inside it'" (11), she conjures the image of the political country 
wracked with the pains of labour, but lacking agency because of her post-colonial state. 
She is overpowered, and controlled and used by a metaphorical father. Romanets 
uncovers contemporary definitions "of Ireland as essentially feminine, in which 
femininity is linked with subordination to the 'masculine' colonizer" (140-41) suggesting 
current gender representations between Ireland and England remain. Aretxaga says that 
this "feminine affinity made Ireland—like women—simply incapable of government, a 
task for which the rational English with their masculine nature were perfectly suited" 
(148). This hard-core colonial ideal led to "English interests [taking] precedence over 
Irish interests whenever those interests were in conflict" (Hearne 87) because the 
masculine then and perhaps still does, takes precedence over the feminine. Ireland, and 
the feminine body in general, are simultaneously divided in order to control their ability 
to govern themselves. So, much like Mary, who no one believes capable of governing her 
own body, Ireland too is stripped of organizational power and decision-making rights as a 
result of the colonial project. According to Maud Gonne, a pre-Independence Irish 
activist, the "primary aim of this movement was 'the re-establishment of the complete 
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independence of Ireland'" as well as the development of "a sense of national pride in 
Irish children and '[the combating of]... English influence'" (Hearne 93). The 
nationalistic dependence on the potential of future children increases the value of the 
maternal role, but simultaneously restricts women to the domestic sphere. Yet, similar 
initiatives, in terms of symbolic self-government, applied to the feminist movement in 
Ireland that "called for 'the complete removal of all disabilities to [the female] sex'" 
(Hearne 93). Each specific group aimed for emancipation, but more importantly the 
ultimate goal was a paradigmatic shift in colonial mindset to validate a non-gendered 
existence for women, who have for so long been defined as only carriers of culture, and 
of children. 
Just as society allocates gendered bodies power based upon the category in which 
they fall, so does the colonial project assign value. At this level, however, the divide falls 
between the colonizer and the colonized. As Kearney argues, the colonial process 
transformed Ireland from a Fatherland to a Motherland (119). Perhaps this lingering 
colonial process distorts masculine Irish identities to the degree that they must increase 
their own abilities to oppress the 'other' and becomes a case of the pendulum swinging 
too far. James's unnecessary presence at the mart suggests he exists in a feminine space 
because he does not contribute to the masculine economy. Similarly, his confinement to 
the home after his injury places him as trapped within the domestic sphere. Reflected in 
the feminine sphere, the value of his masculine existence diminishes and results in social 
re-definition of the dyad. As such, the extreme feminization of women's bodies 
represents an Irish masculine desire to reclaim lost masculinity; a sort of over-correction 
bumps each group equally down the ladder of hierarchical power. These lingering 
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colonial effects alter the characteristics of masculinity and femininity and re-create the 
gendered traits of the binary. 
According to Dresen, the importance of the symbolic child in a patrilineal 
community is of utmost concern. She suggests that because fatherhood is never as 
apparent as motherhood, the child—whether biological or not—must symbolically belong 
to the father in order to "build a firm social order" (155). He must take possession of the 
child to maintain his power. It is "blood sacrifice... that plays this crucial role in 
symbolically confirming patrilineal descent" (155), and killing, or bloodshed, is the only 
"action that is as serious as giving birth" (Nancy Jay in Dresen 156). What is interesting 
about the suicide deaths of James and of Betty Crowe's husband is that both men are 
fathers of children who do not survive. Their babies have miscarried, or have died very 
young. Mary's baby sister died in infancy, and if Mary is not James's biological 
daughter, he has no living children. Just as Betty and her husband produce no offspring, 
James is also a father with no children. The fathers have been unsuccessful at any form of 
carrying on a bloodline and thus at maintaining social order. Their subsequent suicide 
deaths exclude them from society and the resulting backlash, representing the fate of Irish 
subjugated masculinity. The feminine body is once more open, empty, and available for 
further cultural exposure because the so-called protective and validating male is 
inaccessible. 
Again, O'Brien's use of feminine bodies being emptied of blood, water, or even 
children parallels Ireland's history of spilled or emptied blood, and the loss of the 
symbolic child because of a violent division between body and self: 
It was during the rosary it happened. A nose bleed so violent and untoward 
that it gushed as water might from a town pump. She tried to stop the 
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flow, first with her own hanky and then with the loan of a hanky, but she 
couldn't. As well as streaking down her face and chin it was also flowing 
backwards and she thought she would choke.... She believed it was a sign. 
The entire quota of her woman's blood was coming out now, and ever 
after there would be no more blood, she would have shed it all, she would 
be clean and porous as a wafer. (O'Brien 35) 
When O'Brien marks Mary's nosebleed with the reciting of the rosary, she highlights 
religion as a possible stimulus in the history of spilled Irish blood. Further, because Mary 
is unable to control or stop the flow from her body O'Brien indicates the far reaches of 
religious power. The very notion that her blood spills both outside her body—streaking 
down her face and chin—and inside—flowing backwards down her throat—suggests an 
intrinsic bond between her body and her self that religion may not acknowledge. Mary 
ironically seeks refuge in the very institution that threatens her identity. And although the 
blood is flowing from her nose, she equates her blood to menstruation (woman's blood), 
rather than the violently-shed blood of Irish religious and political strife. Her feminine 
body becomes, resulting from her ingrained beliefs, the same uncontrollable and unclean 
entity of which her Church so adamantly warns, and which it demands be subject to 
purification. 
The need to purify menstruating women for both religious and social reason has a 
long history. In "Doctors, Philosophers, and Christian Fathers on Menstrual Blood," 
Jennifer Schultz suggests menstrual blood contains a message of impurity perpetuated in 
an essential androcentrism incapable of perceiving somatic experiences outside its own 
(97). Schultz analyses early Christian male-authored texts and discovers "they exemplify 
the acceptance of a distinct Christian menstrual taboo" (97), which excludes menstruating 
women "not only from the Eucharist celebration but from the church edifice itself (98). 
However, she argues that certain cultural assumptions about feminine biology, such as 
48 
menstrual blood as diseased or inherently impure, primed the conditions for early 
patristic writers to create "a taboo [against menstrual blood] in their move to deny women 
the opportunity to commune with the Divine" (99). Kathleen O'Grady charts many 
"biblical commentaries, even up to the present day" that continue to view menstruation as 
"symbolical of sin" (6). She argues that various sources across different time-periods 
illustrate menstrual blood as part of God's divine punishment for Eve's indiscretion and, 
as such, menstruation became "the divine 'curse' of women" (5). Because of this link to 
Original Sin, menstruation represents "the sinful nature of woman" effecting "the fall of 
humankind" (5). Contrary to the association with Original Sin, however, O'Grady also 
recognizes that some exegetics discount the practice of excluding women based on 
menstrual taboos because there is nothing inherently "punitive" about menstruation (7); 
these taboos are thus based in a popular conception of impurity and sin rather than in 
specific religious or doctrinal precepts. Exclusion from cultural rites or practices reflects 
society's judgement of an individual as inferior or inadequate to participate alongside 
non-deviant members of a community. Female exclusion from religious or divine 
communication only propagates the low status of women in the hierarchy. Schultz cites 
Aelian, a Greek Sophist who asserts, "woman is definitely polluted" (101) and collapses 
"the boundaries between certain women and animals" (101-2). Because the feminine 
body is not the norm—"the hot, dry, unleaking and, therefore, superior male" (110) 
body—women, because of their lack of bodily integrity, are unable to rely on morality 
and reason and are thus symbols of sin (113). Lack of corporeal integrity, based on the 
differences between male and female bodies, reflects a lack of consciousness, and 
because sin is irrational, women are too. 
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The religious creation of women as inherently sinful progresses the validation of 
the so-called superior male and allows her treatment by this patristic group to reflect her 
submission. In Deadly Innocence: Feminist Theology and the Mythology of Sin, West 
argues that traditional feminist theologians place woman as "a submissive virgin who 
knows her place," taught by the oppressive patriarchy to bear the weight of "guilt for 
human weakness and evil that [men] could not cope with in themselves" (xiii).2 Woman 
is the scapegoat that the masculine power de-humanizes in order to identify the privileged 
centre. Maintaining the gender dyad created by Catholicism with Adam and Eve requires 
identifying the 'other', limiting her to ambiguity and highlighting her subordination and 
marginalization. Yet, in O'Brien's text, Jacko says to James: '"Let down by that 
fandango between your legs... And they call women the weaker sex'" (245). O'Brien 
points out how James too is unable to govern his own body and as such, she questions the 
universal construction against women's character. Contradictions between gender 
expectations—men falling to the feminine and women to the masculine side of the 
dyad—in Down by the River points out the idea that masculine and feminine bodies each 
function in similar ways, in that the body does not always behave in the manner intended 
by its possessor. O'Brien affirms the notion that a woman's body identity is falsely 
constructed, and that James, as an Irish man, is also affected by gendered post-colonial 
power relations invoked during British rule. Even though he embraces wildly masculine 
traits—violence, rape, oppression of women, murder, and other improprieties—his 
"hypervirility" (77), as Romanets points out, is related to "the restitution and reinvention 
2
 Please note that the cover page of West's text states the title of book to beDeadly 
Innocence: Feminism and the Mythology of Sin, whereas the title page states the title as 
Deadly Innocence: Feminist Theology and the Mythology of Sin. 
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of Irish 'manliness'... in order to counterpose a widely spread colonial strategy of 
representing colonized males as effeminized" (76-7). Nonetheless, on some levels, James 
maintains his place on the feminine side of the dyad because of his lust and his feminine 
inability to control his body. Of course, the activity that James's fandango partakes in is 
negative to his situation, and he suffers because he is lacking the possession of a licit 
sexual partner. Inglis acknowledges the constructed dynamic that, "[within] marriage the 
woman was seen as the moral savior [sic] of her baser mate" (14). The statement radiates 
essentialism on both sides of the dyad. 
While church and state construct gender roles as complementary to each other, 
they still cannot function practically for individuals. Woman as an individual cannot 
provide moral redemption on her own; the Church is sure to provide her with all the self-
sacrificing constructs on which to base her behaviour, as well as to remove her 
individuality resulting from their concern of feminine resistance to these constructs. 
Through these covert cultural generalizations, woman becomes a symbiotic 
representation of what society demands of her. Regulations surrounding abortion suffer 
from the same habit. In "Procreative Choice: A Feminist Theological Comment," Linda 
Hogan suggests one of the most profound mistakes made by anti-abortion camps is their 
"failure to reconstruct the concrete, lived-world context in which the abortion discussion 
belongs" (179). The homogenization of women by such social practices as Madonna 
emulation, feminine trinity preservation, corporeal hollowing, and de-humanization 
disallow for any real feminine existence; basing any pro-life argument on homogenized 
images 
serves to obscure the complexity of the ethical dilemma, and indeed it also 
harkens back to the days (which we are assured have long passed) in 
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which women were primarily empty receptacles, mobile wombs, valuable 
for our reproductive capacities. (179) 
The hollow feminine is a result. It is the sum of additions and subtractions, and is the 
convergent point for all of the tributaries flowing in and out. Yet, the boundary of the 
body is not as evident as it first appears. 
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2 
The Body Politic and the Body Religious: 
The Other Woman, Rape, and Abortion in Ireland 
"... I want yet again and for indefinable reasons 
to trace that same route, that trenchant childhood 
route, in the hope of finding some clue that will, or 
would, or could, make possible the leap that would 
restore one to one's original place and state of 
consciousness, to the radical innocence of the 
moment just before birth" 
Edna O'Brien, 
Mother Ireland 
"... islands were perceived as liminal places, 
belonging both to the human and the supernatural 
worlds, and islands were sometimes sites for the 
Happy Otherworld" 
Miranda Green, 
Celtic Goddesses 
Perpetual interference and authority by both political and religious patriarchies in 
the arenas of violence, rape, and abortion have created not only an atmosphere of 
oppression, but also a collective mentality that the feminine entity—body and self—is a 
possession at the disposal of the "androcentric systems that make our societies" 
(Isherwood 79). Political use of women's bodies for procreation and delimitations on the 
body in terms of alternative or sovereign existences help to maintain a strong patriarchal 
and religious structure. In Ireland, the practice has been perfected. According to Siobhan 
Mullally, Ireland possesses a long history of debates, referenda, human rights 
committees, conventions and legal reform groups regarding the complexities of Irish 
abortion legislation and practice (79-80). She points out how most pro-women's rights— 
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pro-choice—groups suggest that until the heavy-handed influence of official state policy 
by the Catholic Church is slowed, if not halted entirely, women's rights will continue to 
be compromised (79). However, in "a struggling nation state, scarred by the trauma of 
partition and civil war" women's rights and "gender trouble could not be tolerated" (82). 
Women's issues take back seat to the greater needs of the nation. Even if activists could 
inspire policy or legislative reform, a greater challenge is shifting the Irish paradigm of 
social and cultural gender roles. Demanding reproductive rights for women is simply 
culturally inappropriate. 
Defining the feminine body is not as superficial as designating apparent 
boundaries of corporeal identity. In terms of both actual meaning for the individual and 
for the social structures within which the individual lives, markers of feminine bodies 
merge and flow between reality and the imaginary. In "Possible and Questionable: 
Opening Nietzsche's Genealogy to Feminine Body," Kristen Brown suggests that the 
"value of any item emerges, transforms, or dissolves according to its context and the 
evaluator's perspective" (41). She continues by suggesting that a feminine body consists 
of not only the female physical, but also the female "images and tropes... which have 
traditionally shaped... women's values and status" (41). Cultural perception and social 
need also define the feminine body; bodies manifest into the labels and symbols placed 
upon them. These labels and symbols place specifically feminine bodies into positions 
from which they cannot avoid dissection by the 'other'. Under the guise of, or intent for 
morality and community conservation, feminine bodies then must accede to an increased 
level of submission. Brown argues that the "chaste, 'moral' adult has become so because 
of a personal history of discipline and punishment" (45) through a "penal custom that has 
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become [internalized]" as guilt (48). O'Brien exposes Mary's submission to this religious 
penal culture, and like many of her female characters, it violently removes, from her 
psychological make-up, any possibility for increased agency, or even any awareness of 
personal and individual agency. 
The images and tropes Brown discusses function much the same as the Madonna 
Myth. Feminine bodies become subject to re-creation because of the way that others' 
perceptions—real or imaginary—work upon them, for whatever reason; oppressive 
political or religious power relies on the re-creation and re-definition of the feminine 
body. Abdul Janmohamed and David Lloyd argue that minority discourse and collective 
agency '"is not a question of essence... but a question of subject position'" (qtd in 
Bhabha 229). Pierre Bourdieu argues the power of language and discourse "is nothing 
other than the delegated power of the spokesperson" (107). In this way, authority—state 
or religious—creates identity for a subject or object rather than expressing essential 
components of that individual. Yet, Bourdieu also emphasizes that the spokesperson, as 
"an imposter," only possesses the power from the institution—religion or education, for 
example—and reflects the necessary elements of "routinization, stereotyping and 
neutralization" of the authorized and authorizing institution (109). The subject position is 
neither the speaker nor the spoken-of, but the institution in which they both exist. An 
individual's essence is replaced by subject position, and subject position by institution. In 
light of this identity re-appointment, an individual's apparent power is actually not 
personal at all, but is representative of the institution (111). 
In Ireland, state politics, pressured by religion, shape the cultural space in which 
women exist. Bourdieu calls this sort of existence habitus (12). In his introduction to 
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Bourdieu's text, John B. Thompson argues that habitus "is a set of dispositions which 
incline agents to act and react in certain ways" (12). The "practices, perceptions, and 
attitudes" are normalized to the degree of complete acculturation (12). Possessing an 
internal sense of self, unaffected by societal roles, is difficult in this context, but often, 
only at the moment of blatant domination by the institution does this becomes apparent. 
The cultural intervention of politics and religion "introduces creative invention into 
existence" (Bhabha 9). Culture and society expect individual women to be little more 
than a cultural poesis built from the fluid perceptions between myth, patriarchal 
dominance, and the national desire for a unified past and future. Resulting from this 
social creation of the common or archetypal woman is the loss of the individual. In Down 
by the River, Mary transcends her habitus because she attempts to step outside of the 
roles demanded of her. Her aspirations reflect an internal desire or ambition, which 
disproves the legitimacy of a complete habitus construction. Had she been completely 
acculturated, she never would attempt such civil disobedience as abortion. 
Yet, a history full of social unrest and disruption in Ireland perhaps elevates a 
common will for some sort of defining national identity or culture because these common 
elements create a sense of belonging and value. Therefore, a cycle is created: institutional 
acculturation leads to personal divergence from such acculturation, personal divergence 
inspires a collective embrace of the social comfort of belonging emerging from 
institutional acculturation, and so on. However, Homi Bhabha "challenges [the] sense of 
the historical identity of culture as a homogenizing, unifying force, authenticated by the 
originary Past, kept alive in the national tradition of the People" (37). Concepts of pure 
culture are imaginary, so basing legal, moral, and ethical codes upon a notion of a Golden 
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Age is erroneous. The conflict in Down by the River is evident because perceptions of 
Mary's behaviour and the resulting situation become not just individual and family 
business, but "the whole country's business" (O'Brien 134). As Bhabha suggests, there is 
no actual Golden Age. A culture's persistence to hold fast to mythical national, ethical, or 
moral standards as defining and projecting their collective national identity, results in an 
identity built from past ideologies rather than current realities. In "The Politics of 
Spirituality," Geraldine Finn argues that there is a "'space between experience and 
expression, reality and representation, existence and essence: the concrete, fertile pre-
thematic and an-archic space where we actually live" (Finn 336). 
Finn argues that any real idea of individual identity is quite different from the 
social categorization of "man, woman, Christian, Jew" or as in O'Brien's novel, Irish and 
Irish woman. The myths surrounding all these categorizations create a political sphere 
that both oppresses and perpetuates social conventions. Finn suggests, "this space 
between representation and reality... is the ground of the critical intentions and 
originating experiences that enable us to call the political status quo into question and 
challenge the already known universe and its organization" (336). But why has the Irish 
woman been unable to transcend the mythical status quo and exist "as being-otherwise-
than-being?" (335). Finn discloses that confines in herself she regarded as intellectual 
were actually political (335-6) and when she was able to resolve this conflict, she could 
more easily see the "controlling interests of prevailing political powers" (337). Finn 
writes: 
We are always both more and less than the categories which name and 
divide us. More and less, that is, than a woman, a man, a Christian, a Jew, 
a lesbian, a mother, a wife. More and less than what we stand for in the 
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polis and what stands for us. More and less than anything that can be said 
about us. (337) 
To disregard the fluidity of these categories—to disregard the more and the less of these 
categories—highlights cultural disabilities surrounding the control and agency of Irish 
women. Their bodies are hollow, and the specific boundaries of the body contain each 
individual's meanings of selfhood and interrupt the fluidity of categories; feminine 
homogenization occurs by patriarchal imposition of the constructed boundary and its 
concurrent lack of recognition of fluid identity variations. 
Shortly after the first evidence of Mary's pregnancy and subsequent trip to 
England come to light, some local mothers and anti-abortionists collaborate to influence 
Mary's future: "We're glad to have got you home... Your father is glad and every right-
minded person in the country is glad" (O'Brien 151). The women arrange for her a 
medical exam in which Mary is provided no privacy or agency: "Noni felt furious at not 
being allowed in with them, because after all she had been the instigator, she was the one 
to have found out and gone to the guards and got Mary's father to sign a letter for the 
solicitor, saying that on no account must she be allowed to leave the country again" 
(O'Brien 153). Mary is, for Noni and for Roisin as well—who eventually does break in 
on Mary's examination—a sort of conquest, and a possession representing an element of 
society in need of saving. The intrusion on Mary's medical examination also represents a 
sort of colonial intrusion or acquisition of the feminine body. Noni's adamant and 
increased sense of national service—by her metaphorical arresting of both Mary and the 
abortion—reflects her sense of national belonging. Advancing her involvement in a 
nationally-heated debate increases her personal and individual worth. Just as Irish men 
overcompensate for their own colonial oppression, so do women apprehend the presumed 
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moral power to act as defenders of the so-called national identity. Noni's sense of self 
relies on her inclusion in this collective ethos. By giving up Mary to the authorities, she 
solidifies, in her mind at least, this sense of inclusion and aligns herself with the 
colonizing power. Perhaps the behaviour of the militant anti-abortionists and the 
disapproving mothers stems from their own inherent hollowing and the "jealousy of a 
thwarted woman seething over her own lost, never-ever-tasted delight of being thirteen 
and fourteen and fifteen" (O'Brien 150). 
In Down by the River, a conversation between James and Noni, on the arrival of 
the journalists to his home, illustrates a certain history of people interfering with others 
for the so-called good of the state. James laments the leaking of Mary's story to the 
journalists by a court clerk: "Oh, I'm not surprised.. .A nation of informers... Always 
were, Robert Emmett [sic] met his doom that way" (191). James aligns himself with the 
famed, yet unsuccessful leader of a rebellion for Ireland's republican revolution (Kearney 
36), and blames his failure on the betrayal by another person rather than his own 
mistakes. Noni herself falls into the category of 'informer' and is akin to the "all sorts of 
busybodies... muscling in on [Mary's] case" she herself rails about (O'Brien 191). She 
even pressures James, under the guise of doing what is best for him and Mary, to give in 
and tell his story to the reporters. Her behaviour and intense display of a need to inform 
or be informed points to an insecurity regarding her own place and no less her lack of 
power. The divide between the "Fors and Againsts" (191) is so distinct that each side 
cannot consider the other as being even slightly legitimate. 
When individuals gather en masse in protest or demonstration, the collective 
voice of the people often rails against a contemporary practice that has strayed from the 
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nationally-identifying notions of the past; the goal is driven by "a longing to return to a 
pristine unity, [or] a time of purity when things were different" (Condren 33). Memories 
of an older culture often collide with these newfound modern praxes. The mass protests 
and debates led by the anti-abortionists over Mary's permission to travel abroad for her 
abortion allude to the notion of what Finn might call an "ethical encounter with others" 
(335). In Mary's case, the social action against her as a fallen woman or whore and the 
physical action to limit her bodily mobility represent the collective desire to return to a 
less-divided Ireland; the social judgements against her represent her exclusion from the 
myth. Regardless, the problem with this sort of idealistic activism—as noted earlier—is 
that the social construction cannot lead back, however well-mythologized, to a pure 
culture. Yet the collective seeks to maintain the myth for the sake of a national identity 
rather than to see Mary's situation for its actual and current realities. 
Oppression against a specific demographic should likely create a common thread 
to bind members of the oppressed group together. Colonial action then, creates a stronger 
sense of self, based on the authoritative 'other'. A minority group, "having been 'coerced 
into a negative, generic subject position... transforms [oppression] into a positive 
collective one'" (Bhabha 229). O'Brien's Irish women work so hard to implicate Mary as 
impure, yet their transformation does not lead to a collective female or feminine positive 
subject position, but rather, because of the feminine body / mother Ireland equation, to a 
collective national mythical position. Bhabha suggests that "[these] fragmented, partially 
occluded values of minority discourse" fall short of the "third space" and impede or 
disturb "self-identification ... and sovereignty of the self (230). In O'Brien's text, the 
women may no longer view themselves as individual women, but simply as extensions of 
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the national and inveterate myth of Irish woman, which is why they fight so hard to 
implicate Mary as guilty. 
The act of social communities placing guilt and blame upon victims of sexual 
crimes is common; the violated body speaks of both the indiscretion and the stigma. In 
Carnal Knowledge: Rape on Trial, Sue Lees argues that the "scapegoating and blaming 
of the victim are marked trends" (75) in rape trials, particularly when the media are 
ardently involved. She says the victims' "past and behaviour at the time of the attack are 
scrutinized, thereby subtly shifting the responsibility onto them" (75). Lees discusses the 
power imbalances between men and women involved in random acts of rape, whereas 
O'Brien's Mary is raped at home by what Lees calls "an intimate" (74). The power 
structures are amplified because they are multiplicitous and ongoing, which is more 
representative of the larger societal oppression at work. According to Lees, once a 
woman "ventures into the public sphere—the male sphere—whether it is the street, a 
public house or a male-dominated workplace... [she] is in danger of being seen as 'fair 
game'" (75). However, Mary's violations all occur within the domestic sphere, either 
within the home or, as with the initial rape, on the bog on her father's property. Contrary 
to Lees' point, Mary remains within the domestic female space and, still, her guilt 
endures. Whether or not Mary's community should perceive her as guilty is practically 
inconsequential; existing as a woman in Eire she is guilty anyway. 
Perhaps because James's injuries confine him to the home, particularly after 
Bridget's death, he begins to perceive the domestic sphere as a re-claimed masculine 
space. Even though the private space is a place of domesticity, generally aligned with the 
feminine, colonial emasculation denies Irish men legitimate space for masculine power 
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assertions. For James, his home becomes a guaranteed territory in which his publicly 
suspended masculine assertions of power can be acted out. As such, when Mary avoids 
the domestic space and moves away, the father and daughter experience a sort of re-
appointment of roles within the home and the community. James even reports to Francie, 
a guard who visits him after his debilitating accident, that Mary was always "[out] 
late.. .She was off with Tara day and night" (O'Brien 138). At the same meeting, James 
laments with specific urgency, "If I could just get away" (137), suggesting a reversal of 
social place. Mary is always off "gallivanting" (136) and James is limited to the home 
with "[memories], too many memories" (137). Lees purports that "[to] be masculine... 
involves independence from relationships, lack of sentimentality, sexual success, 
.. .physical toughness and worldly success" (43), and each of these things, Lees suggests, 
exploits women. James's haunting by memories implies a certain elevated sense of 
empathy normally falling into the female or domestic sphere. 
The reversal of the oppositional dyad removes blame and responsibility from 
James and places it solely on Mary. Media interference also creates unfounded accounts 
of Mary's guilt, and perpetuates both the Madonna Myth, and the myth of woman as 
inherently evil and as "responsible for tempting men" (Lees xix). O'Brien's illustrations 
of the radio talk show depict the divided debate over 'Magdalene' and the "topic for 
discussion ... that was rocking the nation" (O'Brien 186). The first caller names Mary "a 
slut" and suggests so many others are far worse off, as if she should accept her fate 
without any subsequent personal action (186-7). Most of the callers discuss Mary as if 
she were not a real person, which implies both a lack of individual agency and a notion of 
a right to possess women in general. The callers and the host alike dictate phrases such as 
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"corrupting our maidens... [and] destroying the country" (187) in between demands for 
Mary's freedom. 
The debate over Mary's purity or lack thereof is interesting because arguments on 
both sides are extremely heated and passionate. Yet, at the same time, each participant is 
decidedly indifferent to Mary as an actual person. The majority of the discussions relate 
to the reputation and preservation of the country; Mary represents the country, so while 
there is a general concern for her circumstances, it is the way in which her situation 
reflects upon the nation that is the source of her objectification. Lees writes: 
Rape is the ultimate objectification, in which the woman's consent is 
overruled and her humanity denied. The offence poses a threat to physical 
integrity and this is compounded by humiliation and deprivation of 
privacy... Rape is the ultimate denial of female subjectivity in a culture 
where a whole range of sexual practices operates in male interests, (xiii) 
The visible nature of a rape trial shifts blame to the raped woman. In so doing, the 
prosecutor exacerbates female objectification and denies the woman her privacy. In 
Down by the River, national involvement magnifies Mary's case. The courtroom is 
neither confined nor controlled because citizens are passing judgement in every 
institution from the penal system to the pub. James complains about how Mary's story 
leaked from a private hearing meant to be "in camera" (191). The boundaries of the 
courtroom are porous and lacking official structure. So, perhaps this passionate debate 
stems from an intense need to define Irish nationalisms, but because national identities 
are so unstructured, the debate itself, and thus the placement of guilt, follows suit and 
creates further the sense of exclusion from a national identity. Lacking national identity, 
Catholicism is the most significant identity mark upon the Irish citizenry. Catholicism is 
Irish national identity. 
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Like any concept of nationhood, Irish nationalisms result from imaginary 
mythologies. Yet, because of its long colonial history, Irish nationalist practices and 
identity politics rely heavily on the notion of the Irish Catholic Golden Age, and fiercely 
resist British Protestantism. Dependence on conservative ideals of orthodox Catholicism 
functions like a foundational myth and as such, dictates current and ongoing nationalist 
identity. Important to this conservative ideology is the need to embrace practices that 
encourage the strength of the family—in terms of maintaining a domestic hierarchy—and 
resisting revolutionary activity. According to Richard Kearney, Irish "history is complex" 
(7) because Irish nationalism takes on so many forms. In the "Introduction" to 
Postnationalist Ireland, Kearney argues different variations on the notion of nationalism. 
Each of these definitions contains numerous and contradictory elements to aid and abet 
confusion over Irish selfhood, sovereignty and culture. He suggests Irish nationalism is a 
"mirror-image [of] British nationalism" (9), but that "one of the most ingenious ploys of 
British (or more particularly English) nationalism... [is] to pretend that [Irish 
nationalism] doesn't exist" (9). The perception of what exists (the corruption of the 
colonizer) and what does not exist (the notion of a pure Ireland) is juxtaposed. And 
Kearney further points to the link between British and Irish nationalisms as "Siamese 
twins" (9) of which one part, Britain, is both "obsessed by [the other,] Ireland, and 
oblivious of it" (10). The dual personality thus creates what Kearney calls a "separation 
of identities" (9). Linking the feminine entity to the subordinate nation creates the same 
dynamic: obsessed yet oblivious. Consider the process of labelling individuals in a 
collective in order to determine differences and similarities to evaluate and then place 
into a hierarchy. Successful classification—from the authoritarian power's perspective— 
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allows for the perpetuation of the power and creates a procedure that ensures the ability 
of the oppressor to continue to exercise power. Kearney suggests this procedure relies on 
"unpacking wholes in favour of parts; of differentiating in order to better apprehend" (1). 
Foucault, however, apprehends difference and applies it to exclusion {Discipline 199). 
Nation and gender, when colonized, function based primarily on difference from the 
colonialist and homogenization of the colonized. Kearney argues these nationalisms 
depend on the legally inclusive nature of categories (2) and apply status within and 
without the territorial boundaries. 
Yet Mullally argues that Irish nationalism functions as inherently exclusionary 
and, in order to exclude, church and state must regulate particular social practices. 
Regulating citizenry is the goal; therefore, regulating reproduction—and those who carry 
the reproductive weight—is the method. She suggests that running parallel to the anti-
abortion and pro-choice debates were debates concerning the admissibility of immigrants 
and their right to declare citizenship by virtue of birth for their children (101). In 2004, 
the electorate voted to restrict birthright citizenship to children whose parents had lived 
legally in Ireland for a minimum of three years (102). A child unwittingly born in Ireland 
whose parents had lived there for less than three years is denied citizenship. Further, 
government officials debated but eventually discarded on grounds of impracticality 
forcing "non-national women of child-bearing age to make declarations of pregnancy 
when arriving in the state" (103). Even proposing the recommendation not only reflects 
an immense paranoia over the invasion and desecration of the nationalistic body, but also 
presents a great lack of concern for human rights in terms of privacy and bodily integrity 
(103). Kearney outlines how anyone outside of the exclusive patriarchal group functions 
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as a "potential irritant in the body politic" (4). Such exclusionism and restriction toward 
women resulting from a biological or physical capacity affirm the Irish ideal of using 
feminine bodies and reproductive rights as a way for a masculine dominated Church and 
state to fit the feminine 'other' into the delicate patriarchal system. Moreover, 
problematic to the body of Ireland are questions of legitimate boundaries. For a country 
such as Ireland, the territorial boundaries should be clear considering "Ireland is an 
integral island 'surrounded by water'" (Kearney 3). However, long-lasting colonial 
activity interferes with what should be concrete borders. 
In Explaining Northern Ireland, John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary suggest 
Ireland's identity division rests on the belief of the people of Northern Ireland that "they 
differ decisively from the other people in the rest of the island" and this is in part a result 
of its imperial father, Britain (101). The patriarchal figure constructs all selfhood, 
sovereignty and autonomy, so what happens to identity when all of these things are 
defined as necessarily collective or homogenized within a group? McGarry and O'Leary 
outline, in a specifically Northern Irish context, a departure from the homogenized ideal 
of the colonized because of further division to the "exact nature of their nation" (101). 
Conflicts between the population of the Republic and the population of Northern Ireland 
result from varied identities and individual differences within the concise island 
boundary. However, they also argue that a sort of geno-centric violence or aggression is a 
result of the minor differences between groups, which loom large in the imagination 
(253). McGarry and O'Leary point out that potent nationalism rests on the idea of the 
nation as both "collectively and freely expressed and ruled" (13), but this is perhaps not 
the case for the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The homogenization of a 
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collective nationalism is problematic because the collective is not, in reality, 
homogeneous. Just as the patriarchy or the religious power erroneously homogenizes 
woman, they also distort the idea of Irish nationalism. Yet, because the political, cultural, 
social or even gender differences are minimal, the conflicts they spur have the potential 
for intense expansion. 
Dana Hearne discusses how in pre-Independence Ireland a Catholic Church-
focused conservative nationalism eclipsed community-focused nation building projects 
(85). Disregarding grassroots sovereignty in order to privilege a national identity based 
upon the strict confines of organized religion not only elevates the status of the religion 
as integral for identity, but also marginalizes and controls specific groups in very specific 
ways. As such, the maintenance of the Catholic identity paradigm in which women's 
reproductive rights are highly regulated sacrifices their freedom. Communal desires to 
protect Catholicism from Protestant influence in the early colonial period reinforce the 
needs of the Church over the needs of the people. As such, women's subordination 
resulting from Catholicism becomes a positive national symbol of collective 
emancipation rather than one of long-lasting oppression (86). And as determined earlier, 
if the Catholic Church and the nation are feminine, they force real women as socially-
necessary feminine entities into [a] third place. The body politic and the body religious 
replace real feminine bodies and relocate them to an imaginary space where identities are 
likewise imaginary. Privileging a fictional nationalism and religion as legitimate feminine 
bodies diverts meaning and value from actual productive feminine subjects. The 
abundance of imaginary boundaries, spaces, and individual identities further complicates 
efforts to create nationalist identity. 
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For Ireland, the island's borders enforce an unusual nationalist dynamic. In The 
Fall and Rise of the Irish Nation, Thomas Bartlett writes that a long colonial history 
forces the Irish population into "requesting readmission into the body politic" (Bartlett 
30). O'Brien's community of informers may represent this desire to be readmitted, but 
the body politic defines "the People before persons" (Kearney 4). The collective is 
imaginary and mythologized. Contingent on this construction, colonial activity and its 
contradictory mis-definition of the collective disallow the deviant individual admission 
into the body politic. The Irish body religious has an equally grand history, and 
subsequently, social and cultural norms reflect what Tom Inglis calls "the multifaceted 
role of the Catholic church" (9), which "created and maintained" a regime of social 
control (10). In "Origins and Legacies of Irish Prudery: Sexuality and Social Control in 
Modern Ireland," Inglis outlines how the church's changing family demands— 
particularly for women's roles as wife, mother, or nun—created an aura of control of 
desire and pleasure: 
.. .it is a mistake to concentrate on the state, the laws that were passed, or 
the way in which laws were enforced through policing. It is better to 
examine how ordinary individuals were supervised and controlled in 
families, schools, and communities. One of the primary mechanisms of 
everyday policing was the control of desire and pleasure. (11) 
Inglis suggests the nineteenth-century Catholic Church first demanded that marriage and 
children be the ultimate and ideal goal for women aspiring for "social status and moral 
nature" (14). But, following the population explosion between 1754 and 1841 and the 
Great Famine, extreme restrictions upon marriage to reduce fertility were imposed, and 
thus denied women the possibility to fulfil "the ideal role for women of becoming 
mothers" (16). Inglis writes: "This led to an enormous cultural contradiction: the home 
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and motherhood were promoted as the natural vocation for women, and yet most women 
were denied access to this role" (16-7). As such, this contradiction of existence 
necessarily forced women into states of self-denial and self-sacrifice. The Church at once 
defines how women should self-actualize and then denies them that possibility. Yet 
women who did become mothers were still expected to "[inculcate] in their daughters the 
same notions of self-denial and self-sacrifice into which they had been acculturated" (18). 
In this moment of inability to self-actualize, and because of their confinement to 
the domestic sphere and the ongoing cultural promulgation of the rhetoric and ideology 
of self-sacrifice, "Irish women confused their own self-interest with the national interest" 
(Inglis 20). The body religious affects the body politic, and strengthens the forces of 
oppression of women. He argues that there was little evidence of feminine revolution or 
desire for emancipation. Those women who did break out of the domestic sphere did so 
by entering the religious sphere, but even so, "nuns were exemplars rather than 
challengers of the culture of self-denial" (20). As such, when O'Brien's Mary retreats to 
the convent for protection, she actually re-possesses her position in a culture of self-
denial. Mary's domestic sphere or "family home" is not what Inglis would call "the basis 
of civilized society" (14), but of course, the very opposite. By turning to the church and 
the life of a nun when she cannot fit into the role of domestic angel, Mary essentially 
"[renounces her] sinfulness... to ascend to a purer way of life" (Inglis 14). 
Religious imposition in the political arena via the family home is the basis of 
maintaining religious primacy. According to Lene Sjorup, not only does religion impinge 
upon state politics, but also "the Vatican, through its negotiations as well as through the 
construction of a hegemonic discourse on abortion and contraception, has situated itself 
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as a political actor" (81). She argues, the "political legitimacy of the Holy See... does not 
rest upon a constituency, but upon the hegemonic power of hierarchical, political 
Catholicism" (82). The Vatican's self-positioning as a political force at United Nations 
Conferences (81) suggests the issues which it rallies for or against are not religious 
issues, but political ones. This complete self-imposition of religion into state, or even 
world politics illustrates the Church's belief that government legislators must form law 
primarily upon God's law, of which of course, the hierarchical church is the chief 
interpreter (85). The Church's insistence upon remaining involved with regulative and 
legislative elements of society stretches its control into the legal sphere in which it can 
justifiably enforce its moral and ethical codes. Once religious elements are legislated, the 
church no longer is a power that suggests or condones a certain pious way of life or 
living, but is a power that demands and enforces that way of life. 
In Down by the River, O'Brien portrays this danger through Dr Tom when he 
warns Betty that the medical fraternity is "under the thumbs of the bishops" (142). His 
fear is that not only could the religious powers-that-be debilitate his medical practice, but 
also, they could convict him and send him "to Gaol" (142). Religious interference is of 
course extreme in O'Brien's text; it outlines the depths to which religion is entrenched in 
the belief systems of the population and as such, how that indelibility bleeds into the 
governmental and penal systems. The Church defines and relates all identity of the 
feminine entity to the feminine body; any power working upon the entity directs towards 
the body. This sort of religious colonization is very dangerous. Sjorup explains how the 
Catholic Church fully condemned "abortion, even if for therapeutic reasons," which the 
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church defines as abortion "performed when the life of the mother is endangered by the 
pregnancy" (84). The feminine body is legislated to die. 
The depths of this Catholic belief system are profound and lasting. In 2004, 
Cardinal Prefect Joseph Ratzinger, only one year before his papal inauguration, presented 
a paper at the Feast of the Blessed Virgin Mary called "Letter to the Bishops of the 
Catholic Church on the Collaboration of Men and Women in the Church and in the 
World," in which he attempts to place women into the social schema. Ratzinger turns to 
the Bible to substantiate his claims that God created woman for Adam as "a helpmate" 
because animals were not enough to combat his loneliness (par. 6). He argues that the 
term helpmate "does not refer to an inferior, but to a vital helper... so that Adam's life 
does not sink into a sterile and, in the end, baneful encounter with himself (par. 6). That 
Ratzinger argues the term helper is not inferior, but vital, is problematic. The word itself 
carries an assumption that the task in need of help is primary to the existence of the 
helper, and is a term for a labourer who is subservient to a leader or master; Ratzinger 
suggests that the task of avoiding a baneful encounter with the male's own self is primary 
to the existence of woman and she exists only to aid or distract her male counterpart. 
Ratzinger's assertion that "Only the woman, created from the same 'flesh' and cloaked in 
the same mystery, can give a future to the life of the man" (par. 6) homogenizes all 
women as capable of providing a future for a man. However, he equally homogenizes 
men, and reinforces the Church's view that social roles and hierarchies are necessary 
under God. 
If the Church maintains this perspective that God created woman as both a helper 
to men and an aid to "fulfil the meaning of his being and his existence" (par. 6), then by 
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God's divine will, the ongoing oppression of women is just and valid. She would not 
have existed if not to attend to the needs of men, thus diminishing her value as an 
individual and sovereign entity. Ratzinger attempts to privilege his notion that "woman, 
in her deepest and original being, exists 'for the other'" (par. 6), as if existing only for 
others is a positive identifier rather than one that is negating and commodifying. He 
homogenizes woman to the role of wife or mother. Later in the paper, Ratzinger validates 
the existence of the patriarchal structure by suggesting that upon creation, man and 
woman were equal, and their relationships functioned on a base of "equal dignity" (par. 
8). After the moment of the original sin, God altered the relationships between men and 
women to be destined for strife and conflict (par.7). God's original plan for men and 
women included only peace, equality, and concord (par. 7). According to Ratzinger, 
patriarchy and the oppression of woman are punishment for original sin. 
Similarly, as noted above, Ratzinger displays varying levels of the categorization 
of women into specific groups or roles. He writes: "In the scene of the wedding feast at 
Cana, for example, Jesus is asked by his mother, who is called 'woman', to offer, as a 
sign, the new wine of the future wedding with humanity" (par. 10). Being called woman 
to represent mother universalizes varying roles of woman and ultimately encourages the 
reification of the feminine body. Ratzinger is also well-versed in the idea of God as 
masculine bridegroom, and certain places—Israel, or Jerusalem in particular—the church, 
or humanity in general, as the bride. If'"[he] who has the bride is the bridegroom'" (par. 
10), then the possession of the feminine bride is the solitary prerequisite for defining the 
masculine groom. The only prerequisite for the bride is being female and to be in the role 
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to participate in a cultural rite. She at once defines a masculine entity, yet she carries the 
cultural meaning necessary to maintain the system of the religious patriarchate. 
Ratzinger writes at length on Catholicism's demands and expectations of women. 
He acknowledges that "motherhood is a key element of women's identity" and as such, 
society may enclose women within this "biological destiny," creating "a dangerous 
disrespect for women" (par. 13). His solution, which he ironically paints as radically 
feminist, is for these women to remain virgins and act like mothers for other people 
(par. 13). Virginity re-places women from the physical realm of procreation providing 
stronger insight into the "spiritual dimension" (par. 13) and subsequently removes her 
from society's judgment of her as solely corporeal. This Catholic insistence, in a 
contemporary paper no less, that a woman must be either a virgin or a mother is 
astounding. Ratzinger confines women's roles to dealing with elements of family and 
social life in which relationships and support of others are her only necessity (par. 13). 
Religious authorities proceed to place women—through myth, as noted earlier—into 
specific and limited roles within first, the body religious and subsequently, the body 
politic. He eliminates for women any access to individual development and personal 
sovereignty because of what he considers a God-given nature preserving "the deep 
intuition of the goodness in their lives of those actions which elicit life, and contribute to 
the growth and protection of the other" (par. 13). Abortion, for example, has no place 
when women commit themselves to this type of ideology. 
Mullally is concerned that these types of Catholic influences on women's rights 
policy compromise human rights (79); "forcing a woman to carry out a pregnancy is 
cruel, inhumane and degrading" (80). In Catholic Ireland, dependence on gender roles to 
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distinguish sovereign marks of Irish identity as separate from English identity infringes 
primarily on women rather than men (82). Women bear this weight because national 
identity is primarily dependant on citizenry, citizenry on reproduction, and reproduction 
on woman. In this way, Irish nationalism and its subsequent definitions weigh heavily on 
women's human rights. Yet, the process of de-humanizing woman through the hollowing 
of their bodies, the Madonna Myth, and the Feminine Trinity questions any inclusion of 
women as even having access to human rights. Post-colonial projects take precedence 
over any one woman's reproductive autonomy; her sexual and reproductive functions 
out-identify even moral agency (83). In the name of embracing anything not-English, the 
Catholic Church advocates the subordination of women. Self-sacrifice is necessary to 
protect Ireland and Irish ways from the "polluting forces of English law" (84). English 
Protestant society had much more relaxed opinions regarding women and reproductive 
health (84), so Irish practices for similar issues tightened in order to contradict the 
English ways. The Irish system's commitment to maintaining separate spheres through 
legislated gender roles illustrates the depths of sexual difference (85). Mullally suggests 
that although the nation was defined as primarily feminine, "the political activity came to 
be defined as peculiarly masculine" (83), and strived to keep woman in the home and 
devoted to her domestic duties (85). 
Increased pressure on women to devote themselves to their homes and families is 
a result of a common dissolution of religious intimacy and perhaps even degeneration of 
belief in religious affiliations. Sjorup contends that because organized religion in general 
has experienced a substantial waning in popularity, it has developed "special concern... 
for the private sphere, and particularly women's bodies" (82). In Ireland, between 1930 
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and 1960, great economic and cultural expansion corroded previously strong Catholic and 
Marian devotions (Donnelly 183-4). Even so, Ratzinger does not veil his belief in the 
patriarchal and religious right to women's bodies. Reinforcing Catholic ideals—such as 
complete prohibition on abortion—oppressing the feminine body, and disregarding the 
feminine entity may not cause concern for the Church because, according to Anne 
O'Connor, the "Irish folk heritage with regard to abortion is a complex one" (65) with 
long histories reaching back to the "seventh century Irish Penitential of St Finnian" (59). 
The Church is unsympathetic and unapologetic about its antiquated treatment of women 
even amidst its current shrinking membership. O'Connor suggests that these ancient 
cultures blamed miscarriage and natural abortion on "woman's magic" (59), contributing 
to the perpetuation of feminine myth, and subsequently affecting "Christian morals and 
teachings" (64). In most lore women would take responsibility for "doing away with an 
unwanted child," and in "nearly all cases of the folk legend, infanticide, and not abortion, 
is the method for achieving this end" (64). In terms of specifically pre-birth death, 
"however, inducing 'natural' abortion, by means of violence to the feminine body or 
chemical ingestion seems to have been the preferred method" (63) rather than straight out 
abortion to deal with unwanted pregnancy. Measures taken to ensure miscarriage seem to 
proffer less guilt to the active parties. James's violence against Mary, however, is an 
internal attack on Mary and the baby, which he justifies as his right over her as his 
possession. Because in Mary's case, the person taking responsibility for the elimination 
of the pregnancy is not female, but male, taboos regarding the murder of the unborn are 
perhaps dissipated. James physically enacts his desires upon the feminine body; Mary 
calls on divine intervention as she asks the baby's soul to fly away (237). 
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Possession of the feminine body and reproductive processes, by validation 
through the hierarchy of right according to the body politic, allows masculine 
domination. According to Jo Murphy-Lawless, the setting up of the Rotunda Lying-in 
Hospital in 1745 Dublin (69) allowed the male-dominated medical system to claim 
"authority over the lives of women... [and] control... the female body" (73). The 
medicalization and institutionalization of childbirth effectively removed all feminine 
involvement—in terms of midwifery—from the labour and delivery of babies, and 
transferred that occupation to the male, scientific field (73). Before this 
institutionalization of childbirth in lying-in hospitals, women would normally give birth 
at home or in "small cottage hospitals in Ireland" (75). With the development of 
maternity hospitals, a patriarchal and religious government—driven by both economic 
inclinations and so-called moral preservation—could monitor and dictate the movement 
of pregnant and labouring women, restricting not only their physical movement, but also 
the processes of childbirth and female labour itself (71). Murphy-Lawless writes: "The 
power of men midwives to control women in childbirth lay in their ability to postulate a 
connection between the individual body and the needs of the social body" (69). 
The power of the body politic creates for individual women an inability to control 
their own freedom of movement. This gendered "power of state to confine [Irish] women 
within its jurisdiction and to deprive them of the right to freedom of movement" relates to 
a complete arresting of the feminine entity (Smyth 11); her identity is at once confined 
within her gendered body, and her body confined within the nation. The parallels of X's 
1992 legal ordeal in O'Brien's text are explicit. The court ruling in X's case sacrificed the 
rights of X in favour of the rights of the foetus; the viable and culturally profitable inside 
76 
is privileged over the existing individual. Irish judges sanction X's body not only to stay 
in Ireland for at least ten months, but also to continue to exist as a host, or a literal 
carrying case for a foetus that she did not choose to conceive. In this way X's sacrifice, as 
does Mary MacNamara's, mirrors the Virgin Mary's situation as opposed to the fallen 
and possibly repentant Magdalene for whom she is named, because they both were 
impregnated without their consent, and their bodies thus become carriers for community-
defining meaning. X's case breaches and exceeds the authority of religion into penal 
legislation and disrupts the already obscure and strained boundaries between the two 
powers. 
In Eire, indistinct boundaries between politics and religion, and which debate 
belongs where, compound the intensity of the abortion controversy. There may be no 
actual political abortion philosophy over which to debate; if abortion is only morally or 
ethically dictated, then there is no right for legislation on abortion in any case. In 
Abortion Rights as Religious Freedom, Peter S. Wenz argues that the debate over the 
rights of the foetus as a human being is so problematic because "no secular concepts can 
settle this issue... [and] 'the only bodies of thought that have purported in this century to 
locate the crucial line between potential and actual life have been those of organized 
religious doctrine'" (80). Abortion debates do not belong in the political sphere. Because 
religious organizations are often so strongly opposed to the practice of abortion, and 
governing bodies can provide no legal solution other than affording full decision-making 
power to women over individual abortions, the power transfers to religious groups who 
assert their power over not only women in need of, or desiring an abortion, but also over 
political and legislating bodies. A woman's religious affiliation is of no consequence 
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even though the prohibition on abortion is a clearly religious decree. According to Wenz, 
the primary conflict revolves around the indefinitive nature of the foetus. Wenz quotes an 
American judge as ruling, '"unless the religious view that a fetus [sic] is a 'person' is 
adopted... there is a fundamental and well-recognized difference between a fetus [sic] 
and a human being'" (81). Wenz continues: 
So legislation designed to restrict access to abortions in order to protect 
the fetus [sic] is unconstitutional. The fetus [sic] merits such protection 
only if it has human rights. But the fetus [sic] has such rights only on a 
religious view of the matter. Thus, legislation designed to protect the fetus 
[sic] is unconstitutional because it amounts to the establishment of 
religion. (Wenz 81) 
The Establishment of Religion Clause (78) in the American constitution prohibits the 
creation laws involving '"excessive entanglement' with religion" (80). In 1937 Ireland, 
however, the Prime Minister, a few advisors, "and the leading figures within Ireland's 
Catholic Church and the Vatican" drafted the constitution (Mullally 85). Religious 
influence is forefront, explicit, and expected. Thus, Ireland's constitution protects 
complete prohibition of abortion except in the case that the mother's life or health is in 
critical danger (Smyth 25-6). 
The development of legislation pertaining to abortion and human versus foetal 
rights is questionable and perhaps biased toward religious aspirations and ambitions. 
Article 40.3.3 specifically addresses the state's acknowledgment of "the right to life of 
the unborn" (26), which is due to the profound influence of the Catholic Church. In The 
Second Partitioning of Ireland?: The Abortion Referendum of 1983, Tom Hesketh cites 
Marilyn Field's research as concluding "the size of the Catholic population within each 
country [has] a greater determining impact on the permissiveness of the nation's abortion 
laws than any other single factor" (39). According to Hesketh, when "dealing with such 
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[ethical] problems the Catholic Church adopts an 'absolutist' stance... which posits that 
an action may be right or wrong depending on whether it conforms with or is contrary to 
the Law of God" (42). But because the Church is so entrenched in the Irish way of life, 
the government, its polity and policies become unavoidably and irrevocably entangled 
with religious values. 
O'Brien's Ireland is certainly no exception. Francie candidly asserts to James: 
"The law of the land, James... The Law of God" (O'Brien 139). This conversation 
between James and Francie, a police guard, represents the essence of patriarchal thought 
and power. When Francie first informs James of Mary's trip to England for an abortion 
James declares, "I'll kill her" (O'Brien 138). Francie responds, "Well, before you kill her 
we better get her back..." (138). The Garda's apparent disregard for James's threat on his 
daughter's life suggests his of acceptance of both violence and gendered possession. Of 
course, Francie is, at this point, unaware of James's involvement in Mary's pregnancy 
and likely disregards the threat as idle. But even so, his assertion of "Stress... Mega 
stress" (139) points to his own internalization of masculine responsibility for the 'weaker 
sex' and his duty to stop the abortion. Francie maintains: "Now we can't allow that... We 
have to put a stop to that..." (138). The perceived responsibility and the right of the 
privileged patriarchy place them in a position to attempt control and exert power over 
anyone outside of the privileged group. 
Masculine administration as conjunctive with religious authority provides no 
rights for women regarding power over the bodies and their children. In The History of 
Sexuality, Foucault states that "one of the characteristic privileges of sovereign power 
was the right to decide life and death," as it was the right of the father to inflict death 
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upon "his children and slaves [because] just as he had given them life, so he could take it 
away" (135). In this way, a woman's right to choose an abortion over bearing a child is 
an infringement upon the rights of the father or the rights of the religious or political 
state. Even any state or religious interference with attempted suicide is a infringement 
upon an individual's ability to make decisions for the existence of her—or his—own 
body. Yet, Foucault argues that suicide is illegal because "it was a way to usurp the 
power of death which the sovereign alone, whether the one here or the Lord above, had 
the right to exercise" (138). 
The chapter "Broomstick" illustrates the practical application of the brutal notion 
of Foucault's right of death (Foucault History 135). James's attempt to issue an abortion 
with a broomstick (O'Brien 104-6) portrays an extreme disregard of Mary as an 
individual, and by extension, of her baby. It violently reiterates the idea of the hollow 
body, not only insofar as Mary-as-an-entity is not synonymous or indistinguishable from 
her body, but also that the infant inside her body is likewise hollow; James's violence 
metaphorically and literally hollows out her body. The baby itself is just a body with no 
potential for individual identity. The violence against the body represents the epitome of 
the female body as simply material object. Now empty of subjectivity, Mary's body is 
free to become fully possessed by those who oppress her. James exercises his power 
against her, as a father with a right to death, because she is nothing but a vessel to him. 
He forces Mary into both the crime and the punishment for that crime, further 
constructing her as a vessel for disgrace by placing all blame upon her physical body. 
Foucault only briefly addresses rape and fails to acknowledge the imposition of 
sexuality—and power for that matter—on the body of the raped; his discourse instead 
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lists rape alongside "adultery... spiritual or carnal incest... sodomy, or the mutual 
'caress'... homosexuality... marriage without parental consent, or bestiality" {History 
38). His list outlines deviations against the body politic, but fails to differentiate between 
victims and offenders. In this instance, Foucault privileges the damage to the community 
from sexual deviation over the damage to the individual. His neglect to address the 
violation of women as exercising power affirms that his primary interest is the offence 
directed at the community. The same dynamic seems to be at work in Down by the River, 
as James disregards both Mary's body and the body of the unborn baby for his own 
patriarchal ends. 
In Women and Rape, Cathy Roberts argues that constructed feminine passivity 
"provides an idea of woman as existing to be used" and creates a "background to 
victimization [and] the denial of self control" (8). Roberts suggests culture based on 
male-female relationships within the home both reflects and perpetuates the power 
structures and belief systems of the patriarchal society. Gender relationships in and out of 
the home—and illustrated explicitly in O'Brien's text—mirror "how intimacy is reduced 
to a form of ownership" (Roberts 15). The archetype of the child, particularly a female 
child, doubly binds the child as possession. Mary's subordination is twofold; as a child 
she is the automatic property of her father, and as female she does not even carry the 
capacity or potential—as a male child does—to grow into an independent role. Roberts 
writes: "Because an intimate relationship is the last place abuse would be expected, when 
it does appear women are less prepared and therefore less able to oppose or avoid it" 
(15). Mary, in Ireland and in her home, as the object of James's violence and sexuality 
becomes at once victim, criminal and sacrilege. 
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Revolutionary—or rebellious—acts, such as Betty Crowe's chaperoning Mary to 
England for her abortion, may operate on an individual level to expand a person's 
experience and existence, but rarely shed enough light on the power system to affect 
paradigmatic change. Geraldine Finn writes: 
Our lives exceed the categories that organize our relationship to power and 
to each other. Claiming that excess against the category that names and 
contains us broadens the political scope of the category and thus the 
political scope of our lives. But it leaves the category and the 'class' 
system it articulates intact and available for recuperation and control by 
and for the ruling apparatus if this is all it does. (343) 
The ongoing and heated debate over Mary's character and circumstances only broadens 
the political scope of her type, yet does nothing to address the conflict within the system 
as a whole. Her actions do not necessarily or generally create sympathetic perceptions of 
her, or others like her, and actually may increase the negating stereotypes against her. In 
Down by the River, the politics of oppression by church and state remain, just like Finn 
might suggest, intact. However intense the violence for recreating spaces for feminine 
bodies, the political and religious bodies experience little of the dissection suffered by 
these feminine bodies. In Masterminds of the Right, Emily O'Reilly points out that a 
major downfall of Article 40.3.3—the constitutional amendment outlining a foetus's 
human rights—is that the legislation fails to "regulate how the conflicting rights of 
woman and unborn reconcile" (131). And although O'Reilly suggests the major players 
within the legal system were profoundly concerned and aware of the consequences of 
even coming to some sort of resolution for X's case, she also reports a certain sense of 
anxiety on the government's part as being unable to deal with the conflicting rights of 
mother and unborn (133). 
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According to O'Reilly, both church and state exhibited contradictory stances over 
X's travel status, and at once maintained absolute prohibition on abortion, yet continued 
to rally for her freedom to travel (133). Although these contradictions ultimately led to 
the lifting of restrictions on her movement and thus her ability to procure an abortion, 
they also represent a desire to avoid illuminating the objectives of the entrenched systems 
of power. These irreconcilable ideologies symbolize not only a political and religious 
desire to maintain control over women's bodies, but also to keep that control silent and 
unquestioned. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault argues the regulating power must be 
invisible and silent in order to preserve and sustain a necessary repression (201). For 
Foucault, this silencing begins with a procedural hysterization of women, involving a 
thorough medicalization of their bodies and their sex {History 147); as mentioned earlier, 
a perfect setting for controlling and medicalizing feminine bodies is the Rotunda Lying-in 
Hospital in Dublin. Foucault argues women's subordination and acceptance of the 
procedure are necessary as part of the "responsibility they owed to the health of their 
children, the solidity of the family institution and the safeguarding of society" (147). 
Foucault writes: 
Nothing that was not ordered in terms of generation or transfigured by it 
could expect sanction or protection... It would be driven out, denied, and 
reduced to silence. Not only did it not exist, it had no right to exist and 
would be made to disappear upon its least manifestation—whether in acts 
or in words. {History 4) 
In terms of sexuality—of which women were inherently and physically bound by an 
absolute gender identity prescript—and internal identity (of the non-sexual nature) there 
was no need for social address; women's rights were denied and, in the national sense, 
did not really even exist. It is no wonder that Irish government and the Catholic Church 
83 
were both so uncomfortable with X's situation and its progression into not only the penal 
system, but also, through the media, into the crucial scrutiny of public debate. The public 
nature of X's case unfolds the hidden agendas of the patriarchal and religious power 
structures. Similarly, Mary MacNamara's personal situation is marginalized by the 
greater needs of the power systems to protect their own oppressive projects and maintain 
the entrenched repression. 
In a rare episode where James is not behaving violently towards Mary, the father 
and daughter work together to help birth a foal. The "mare [is] so pitiful it is as if she is 
being carved within" (61) and she acts as if she is "determined to escape the violence 
within her" (60). Mary's hand in the hollowing of the mare points to her forced 
submission and consequent willingness to conform to the status quo, and to the 
regulations and expectations set out for women by the state and the Catholic Church. 
Moreover, Mary not only reluctantly assists with feminine hollowing, she also cooperates 
with the masculine appropriation of female labour because of James's interference and 
control over the birth. At the onset of the labour, Mary attempts to leave to call for help, 
but James forces her to stay. In this case, the hollowing of the mother is brutal, and after a 
long fight to right the position of the foal, James announces, "[she'll] fly out, she'll fly 
out now" (62). Of course, the tension created from the inside—or what is inside— 
fighting the outside aligns with the notion of privilege; the mother "stops breathing as if 
it is all too much, as if she will die... [and] the foal is the stronger, her energy and her 
thrusting prodigal now" (61). The birthing process transforms the mare into a site from 
which the foal needs to escape. The threat to the existence of the mother is 
inconsequential and that which is inside possess every advantage because of its value as a 
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commodity. The physical and biological reality of childbirth equates to and validates for 
the patriarchy a prescribed idea of the feminine body as a vessel. Corporeal binds fetter 
the feminine body into the social construct because reproduction depends upon the 
biological feminine body to carry a foetus physically and the metaphorical feminine to 
carry on culture. Because of biological roles, the placement of the feminine body into the 
gender dyad—as it is—is practically unavoidable. 
The foal is born after the "obduracy of almost an hour" and in true O'Brien style, 
comes as a "tender swathe of wet flesh, fluid, dimensionless, with the beauty of a stream 
or a river..." (62). At almost the very moment of birth, however, James calls the foal 
"villain" (62). Once the inside is out, the marginalization is instantaneous. The mother is 
docile because all that happens to her is imposed upon her rather than being her own 
active choice; she emerges from the labour automatically submissive and domestic, 
cleaning her offspring once the violence has subsided. James's treatment of the foal 
immediately following its birth is important to maintain the idea of the homogenized 
feminine body. He pats the foal as he calls her villain, and then "pats [Mary] as a moment 
before he had patted the animal" (63). James's equal treatment of both woman and 
animal suggests his inclination to group them as one, at once denying them agency, 
individuality, and most particularly, humanity. 
The mare's inability to manage on her own during childbirth represents the idea 
that feminine bodies exist out of feminine individual control. If a feminine body is 
incapable even of independently playing out an activity inherent to it—childbirth—then 
perceptions surrounding the feminine body as in need of assistance or intervention is 
expected. Masculine interference in childbirth may actually create this construed notion 
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of possession over the body and the subsequent use of it for cultural purposes. Betty 
Crowe's feminine body is also inactive and docile; her barren and empty body prevents 
her from acting out her desires to be a mother (O'Brien 111). She is haunted by her 
numerous miscarriages and the possible suicide of her husband, whom she could not 
legitimize by providing him children. Her body failed him socially and culturally by its 
physical inability; her body could not function for its intended purpose of production and 
maintenance of culture. Mr Crowe—as a masculine entity—could not fill her up and use 
her body to increase his own power. Foucault's attention to docile bodies focuses on the 
idea of a "political anatomy" {Discipline 138). The political body operates by limiting 
power of the individual body: ".. .on the one hand, it turns it into an 'aptitude', a 
'capacity' which it seeks to increase; on the other hand, it reverses the course of energy, 
the power that might result from it, and turns it into a relation of strict subjection" (138). 
The body politic needs to apply meaning to the body in order to detach power from the 
individual. The pushing and pulling of energy further disable personal agency and force 
the idea of the body into a space where the only value or purpose is relational to social 
use and meaning. This sense of communal access to the individual body not only results 
in a sense of colonial entitlement to the body, but also to its availability as a site for the 
articulation of social penal practice, and for a culturally-defined notion of natural 
characteristics of the feminine body. 
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3 
Ambiguity and Anonymity: 
The Feminine Entity as Object and Anti-Human 
"It does not hurt if you say it does not hurt. 
It does not hurt if you are not you." 
Edna O'Brien, 
Down by the River 
The paradigm of gender oppression for cultural or social advantage includes the 
generalizing efforts of patriarchal control to reduce women's individuality to the point of 
ambiguous de-humanization. If all women are equal, but only to each other, all feminine 
individuality is thus void and all agency arrested. Women become, through ambiguity— 
in reality and in the text—anonymous, interchangeable, and their individual power 
nullified. In Down by the River, Edna O'Brien feminizes her female characters— 
regardless of their human or animal status—to the point of anonymity. The feminine 
entity exists only for being feminine and her worth depends only upon her ability to 
perpetuate the success of the community as a vessel for reproduction. The female body is 
the site for both ambiguity and anonymity, which effectively limits and inhibits 
individual freedom and expression. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault suggests, "project 
the subtle segmentations of discipline onto the confused space of internment, combine it 
with the methods of analytical distribution proper to power, individualize the excluded, 
but use its procedures of individualization to mark exclusion" (199). The levels of 
individualization occur only to mark exclusion from the privileged side of the "binary 
division" (199) where masculine entities reside and preside. 
87 
If family structures both reflect and create national ones, and family politics are 
based upon gender dynamics within the family, the politics of nation building are thus 
inextricably linked to notions of gender. In "The Family as Cave, Platoon and Prison," 
Eileen M. Hunt tracks the transformations of the patriarchal family structure noting how 
families function to create close communities and subsequently strong nations. She looks 
primarily at Mary Wollstonecraft's work, but also addresses the alternatives offered by 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Edmund Burke. Although the three differ regarding notions 
of requisite familial expectations, they do agree that family structure and character work 
to support the constitution and development of communal or national success (E.M. Hunt 
81-2). Hunt outlines the hierarchies within the family as reflections of the larger 
community. Endowing all power upon the patriarchal head of the family ultimately 
places his feminine counterpart in a subordinate position and as such diminishes any of 
her possible authority. Just as the father has power granted him for being masculine, a 
state of femininity naturally usurps the mother's power. 
Deducing the base of feminine oppression as the family, and then as reaching up 
the social structure to the nation, creates some interesting tensions. Consider the feminine 
body as a solid boundary—as with Ireland as an island—whose physical limits are 
apparent and unmistakeable. Contained within this concise body are constructed 
identities that are blurred because of outside and authoritarian influences. So while 
feminine identities should perhaps be fluid and changing as they are acted upon by an 
individual's life experiences, containment within the body boundary shuts off individual 
identity. As such, limited variation for individual identity creates a feminine ambiguity 
rigidly defined within these boundaries and stripped of its potential for actual identity 
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development. The feminine body as a vessel contains only information from outside 
sources; political and religious bodies use the feminine body to convey only the 
information they desire and leave the individual fundamentally trapped in her own body. 
Because the family structure confiscates her power, she maintains no ability to construct 
her own identity as a sovereign individual. 
The inability to define oneself, specifically because of cultural categorizations 
within the family and society, begets feminine anonymity. According to Green, resulting 
from the transitions to Christianity, "many pagan deities were downgraded to the status of 
demons" {Goddesses 196). Such is not the case for Brigit, who managed—like a few 
occasional others—to maintain her status and take on the role of a Christian saint. Green 
suggests that Brigit—both the goddess and the saint—represents power and authority, 
fertility, healing, motherhood, and "the future well-being of Ireland" (198). Yet, Green 
argues that while many god-names often symbolized a "title rather than a true name" 
(196), the practice seems specifically significant in Brigit's case. Her name comes to 
symbolize, as a categorical title, a feminine entity that possesses a certain amount of 
power. However, with the conversion into Christianity, she lost her status as "a historical 
figure" and therefore "gives rise to the suspicion that she may be a mythic figure who 
underwent a humanization-process and was thus endowed with a false historicity" (198). 
Green's portrayal of many pagan goddesses as adequately empowered juxtaposed with 
Christian representations of women suggests that women lost significant power at the 
onset of Christianity. Patriarchal dominance in the form of new religion usurps Brigit's 
pagan power and mythologizes her actual existence. So, much like Brigit, O'Brien's 
Bridget is an anonymous feminine, empowered to the degree she can contribute as a 
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mother to the future of the nation, and defined to the point only of myth. Early 
Christianity encases Brigit's power and her identity, and alters her potential for future 
personal identity construction. 
O'Brien represents the feminine identity trapped within a case in the episode in 
which Mary goes to the mortician's house to visit her deceased mother. She notices a fly 
"[slip] underneath the lid and [vanish]" into the coffin just before the undertaker 
"slammed the lid down, tight as a drum" (O'Brien 57). Mary's intuition that the two 
creatures within the coffin, her mother and the fly, would each "go mad" (57) highlights 
her awareness of the patriarchal confines of the concise boundary. The coffin sealed up 
tight as a drum by a member of the masculine group confines the feminine entity within 
an imaginary identity to the point at which she goes mad. Sealed within the inescapable 
vessel of her body is her self and it is never able to be fully determined because, 
according to the religious patriarchate, it does not exist. Understandably, the notion of the 
feminine self, sealed within a very concise boundary to the point of insanity, seems 
severe and even universalist. However, given the dynamic of the Irish social and religious 
systems in which women were very much accessory to their own feminine myth, this 
insanity or madness is perhaps more so a loss ofthe potential for feminine self-
actualization and an impossibility for emancipation. The religious patriarchy erases the 
possibility of a future realizing feminine aptitude and potential. 
Imperative to ideals of a nation's past and future is the process of national 
identity. As noted above, representations of the past may not be actual, but imaginary so 
for society to base gender roles upon these imaginings creates current and future 
inventions of the nation and its citizens. In "Gendered Representations of the Nation's 
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Past and Future," Silke Wenk suggests national movements were "frequently structured 
from their very beginnings according to modern conceptions of gender polarity" and 
resulted in a sort of natural unity signifying belonging (63-4). However, because 
"collective memory functions... as a reservoir for images that explain and support each 
other" (64), the "feminine is relegated.. .as an image or a sign" (65). So, much like the 
Madonna Myth, and de Beauvoir's myth of woman, collective memory and foundational 
myths act to exclude women—based on past practices—from current and future 
involvement of political and cultural negotiation, and all the while demand personal 
sacrifice for that very nation. Challenging feminine future potential for autonomy is the 
obstruction of a collective memory of the past; her potential to exist outside her political 
symbolism is aborted. 
Additionally, the living fly in the coffin of the dead woman evokes the image of a 
living creature, alive, but bound to die contained and trapped inside; the potential for 
life—or self—is ultimately aborted. The fly is like Mary's baby, a conundrum of life and 
death; the only place that will now provide its life—or progress its existence—is the very 
place that will initiate its death. It is almost as if the baby is already dead; it just needs to 
die. Its potential for existence is both denied and unwanted. Mary's body is at once the 
giver of life and the coffin; Ireland too exists to carry its citizens, but simultaneously 
impedes actual identities or existences for that citizenry. Mary herself is aware of the 
conflict. Just as Wollstonecraft's Maria "[mourns] for the babe of which she was the 
tomb" (Maria 152), Mary MacNamara deplores her child: 
.. .if only you were my sister or my brother but not my child. If you could 
be spirited out of me that would be all right, more than all right. It is just I 
cannot bear you. I am asking your soul to fly off now and wait for the 
right mother... (O'Brien 237) 
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Mary mourns for her child too because of the choice forced upon her. Ironically, at this 
point in the story, her baby is also her sister or her brother, and not only her child. The 
way in which she says, 'if only you were my sister or my brother' and 'wait for the right 
mother,' suggests she accepts the baby as having the right father. O'Brien overturns a 
number of conventions at this point. The fact that Mary's baby possibly has the right 
father is a departure from other parts of the text, in terms of the colonial and patriarchal 
symbolic child. Similarly, that this child could have the wrong mother imparts the logic 
that mothers cannot be ambiguously inter-changed; any mother is not just any mother. 
Having the wrong mother reinforces actual feminine individuality because it approves 
inherent variation even within the feminine maternal. Mary feels no rights of possession 
for the baby and is consequently conflicted. Perhaps this rejection of possessing the baby 
represents her denial of parental right to possess, as well as the role imposed upon her as 
mother. She says, "I don't want to have it and I don't want to kill it" (235); thus, she 
acknowledges the binds to her decision and her inherent predisposition to sacrifice. 
As a woman—and also as a child—O'Brien's Mary is in unfamiliar decision-
making territory and rejects having to make an active choice regarding the life and death 
of her baby. She is aware that her family, and perhaps Ireland as well, are full of children 
with wrong parents because just as Mary instructs her baby to wait for the right mother, 
she also recognizes that for her, James "was the wrong father" (235). Responding to 
Mary's judgement of James, Mrs Fitz says: "And yet, you're you because of him" (235). 
She suggests that James, regardless of his crimes or inappropriate behaviour, has 
somehow influenced positive attributes in Mary. The female entity is created and defined 
by the male authority, and Mrs Fitz's attribution of Mary's selfhood to James reaffirms 
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the masculine power and feminine subordination in terms of both identity development 
and individual sovereignty. After the rape in the bog, James says to Mary, "What would 
your mother say... Dirty little thing" (5). He at once affects her by his actions, and then 
labels her as he sees fit. She is herself because of him. 
The social or cultural habit of labelling for the good of the community functions 
not only to define value or meaning, but also to create the system within which each 
group falls. After Mary escapes from the care of her cousin Veronica, she seeks refuge 
with a group of lawyers. The activists outside Hennessy's house hold placards and 
banners "draped with rosaries [and] carry pictures, mostly of the Virgin with 'Save the 
Baby', except for one with the simulation of running blood and which reads 'Thy Sister's 
Blood?'" (O'Brien 197). At this point, James's paternity has not yet been determined, so 
O'Brien's word choice for the placard recognizes the extent to which feminine bodies are 
homogenized. All women are sisters because they are all equal to each other under the 
religious patriarchy; the Father, God, possesses all women. Equating all women as sisters, 
including the unborn, provides the foetus with rights equal to those of women already 
born and furthers the practice of feminine homogenization. 
The moral argument over abortion is extensive on both sides of the divide. The 
religious argument fears for the souls of unborn children and aims to maintain God's 
omnipotence, yet fails to consider the moral implications upon the body of the mother. 
Thus, consideration of the mother's body as public rather than private establishes and 
promotes the use of the feminine body as symbol. As such, this use of the body sets up a 
political system within the private domain allowing the application of the body for 
nationalistic purposes. Privileging imaginary nationalist and religious constructs, based 
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on previous colonization, forces the country itself into its own womb-tomb—or symbolic 
body boundary—because the magistrates and members of the community define the 
constructs and implications on the entire community. The body they exist within—the 
country—alters the internal identities of its individual inhabitants, yet simultaneously 
negates the individual. The country is the case and all within are one. Judge Mahoney 
calls the day of Mary's hearing "a day of general judgement upon us all" (O'Brien 247), 
and Noni asserts that Mary's pregnancy is "the whole country's business" (134). Both 
Noni and Judge Mahoney recognize the fact that the feminine body, and by extension the 
individual encased in it, is not the matter of herself, but is in fact a possession of the state 
and other authorities. In a separate debate over the value or existence of souls in certain 
communities, Donal, who takes personally an "insult to bishops" (166), declares that 
uncivilized "savages" (165) have no souls. Aligned with the religious colonizer and the 
privileged centre, Donal condemns the savages. Yet, Hugo responds: "On the contrary, 
they revere the soul... they put hooks and cages around a body to keep the soul from 
flying away" (166). This reversal of ideology actually suggests that those who "revere the 
soul" or the insides, over the physical body are at least in part uncivilized. If Hugo is 
right, then his argument, held up alongside Irish abortion law, suggests the magistrates 
and religious authorities are themselves uncivilized. The feminine body is a victim of 
these savage constructs designed to hook and cage women into submission by forces 
acting upon their bodies. 
The body politic and the body religious cage feminine bodies by default into 
positions of impurity and sin in order to privilege the masculine power. In an attempt to 
purify themselves, Lizzie and Mary visit a sacred shrine and believe they "were to touch 
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the private part of their bodies with the water to banish all stain of past or future sin" 
(68). This act suggests a desire to return to the state of innocence, but because the notion 
of the feminine body as impure is so deeply entrenched in them, they can no longer see 
themselves as innocent. They have already bought into the patriarchal view that they are 
evil; their impurity is as inherent as their bodies are feminine and all their attempts at 
purification are in vain. Shumaker suggests women often "reveal their sense that the 
female body is an inherently evil possession for which they must compensate" (186) but 
that "revulsion against their bodies comes from the self-hatred engendered by a religion 
that regards female sexuality as evil" (189). This constructed bind further hinders Mary in 
terms of her own rights or internal will because she lives within an inaccurately 
constructed identity, or within a patriarchal coded identity. Her social functions are likely 
affected and she extends the practice of codifying her actions. Her need to write her 
request "to the statue of the Virgin" in "code" (O'Brien 69) illustrates how she is aware 
of these binds—of what is allowed or accepted of her as a feminine entity—and perhaps 
that she is in part always aware of the depths of her own acculturation. 
Notions of communicating in code translate also to other forms of dialogue. 
O'Brien relies heavily on the notion of gossip. In so doing, she illustrates how a 
community communicating by means of assumption and rumour represents a general 
disregard for the truth and impart a deliberate and common uncertainty. The events 
surrounding Mary's pregnancy are left to assumption (69) and are subjected to gossip and 
rumour, even though O'Brien suggests "all is always known, nothing is secret, all is 
known and scriven upon the tablet of time" (6). Mary never speaks specifically of the 
paternity of her baby and O'Brien never provides official verification. The system that 
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oppresses the articulation of feminine sexuality proves again to be an "inescapable 
patriarchal and religious power" (Shumaker 188) that contributes to the ambiguity of 
truth. Moments of hope, for truth or emancipation, suggest that feminine articulation of 
an individually-dictated reality is possible, but still enigmatic. Lizzie assures Mary that if 
an eel attends their visit to the shrine, "everything would turn out right" (68). If an eel is 
symbolic of "secrecy, mystery and dissimulation, but also something that 'slips through 
your fingers,' that you can't hold on to or understand" ("Eel"), then the assumptions 
regarding Mary's circumstances may never be fully known or understood; but, if Lizzie 
suggests everything will be all right, perhaps the facts do not need to be discovered. 
Viewing the feminine body as strictly biological denies and restricts feminine 
individuality. In "Contract Motherhood: Social Practice in Social Context," Mary Gibson 
debates whether legislating any form of pregnancy—either surrogacy or contract 
pregnancy—"reflects and reinforces a view of women as primarily suited for 
reproduction and of... that of a vessel carrying a man's child" (63). She suggests that 
women are "doubly demeaned by this view" because femininity as such is reduced to the 
reproductive role and the "uniqueness and importance of that role is denied" (63). The 
commodification of the process and labour of childbirth projects the feminine entity into 
a productive and industrial sphere based on biology. Both elements open up the 
homogenous reproductive vessel that is woman to "direct interference... and violation of 
the bodily integrity" (63). Without doubt, then, in a culture where religion and politics 
ultimately deny women self-determination and even self-individualization, the same 
forces contractually protect the product of this labour at the expense of the so-called 
machine. Thus, the child—born or not—is privileged over the mother machine. 
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O'Brien's text illustrates the depths of the homogenization of the feminine body 
through her use of ambiguous pronouns that do not always allow the reader to determine 
which individual woman is actually present in any given episode. Even during the most 
extreme moments of violation, Mary's name is rarely used. Immersed in his crime, James 
"allows himself... to advance into a charade that she is not she, she is a stranger in a 
black dress" (O'Brien 83). He imagines she is another woman, or, progressing further 
into his delusion, that "her body [is] no more than a pillar or a bit of galvanise to thresh 
against" (84). His objectification of her is two-fold; he at once replaces her personal 
identity as his daughter with an ambiguous and homogenized image of any woman, and 
then he replaces the notion of the homogeneous woman with that of inanimate object. 
James's long-term treatment of Mary as a physical entity—lacking in subjective 
traits—truncates, even within her own identity, elements of humanity. In Dehumanizing 
Women: Treating Persons as Sex Objects, Linda LeMoncheck writes: 
.. .for a person to cause another person to be an animal, body, or object 
involves manipulating the circumstances in which that person lives in such 
a way that the person is either prevented from developing some or all of 
her or his distinctive human capacities or is caused to lose some such 
capacity already developed. (32) 
She argues that the repression involved in the de-humanizing process is complete and 
long-lasting. As with any form of social or personal conditioning, consistency is the pre-
eminent factor functioning against the oppressed feminine individual to the point of 
complete acculturation. LeMoncheck points out the "person is effectively reduced to 
realizing only those capacities that things, bodies, or animals have" (32) because she has 
been treated as such for so long by the patriarchal power whose "intent [is] creating an 
army of obedient automatons" (33). 
97 
The Irish feminine meets the same homogenizing end. Social and religious use of 
the Madonna Myth as the exemplar emulate, and the agreement by the female population 
to this ideal create ambiguity-building stereotypes that allow for the perpetuation of 
myth, oppression, and the patriarchate. According to LeMoncheck, the feminine 
"stereotype is restrictive if it fosters certain intimidating kinds of sexual role expectations 
that make it difficult for [women] to live self-determined lives" and "[tends] to lump 
[them] in categories that would blur their uniqueness as individuals" (105). For Irish 
women to be essentially lumped into a corporeal existence impedes recognition as "a 
moral equal with a right against bodily harm" (LeMoncheck 33). O'Brien's feminine 
characters suffer the same fate. 
In an episode where Betty and Mary visit the abortion clinic in London, they wait 
in a little green enclave in front of a statue which had six heads, the 
colour of anthracite, supported on the one body, the faces all different, 
different manifestations of courage. Under the statue she read - 'This 
figure is erected to replace another figure destroyed by vandals to whom 
the truth was intolerable.' (128) 
This one small passage is pregnant with gendered and corporeal implications. O'Brien 
does not specifically profess the statue as feminine, but given that it stands at an abortion 
clinic, it carries the feminine elements of corporeal homogeneity, and because she writes 
of the feminine effigy earlier in the text, assumptions regarding the statue as feminine are 
both possible and likely. The statue possesses only one body for multiple heads, which 
illustrates the conflict between the individual and the ambiguous Irish feminine body. It 
at once speaks the truth of the patriarchal notion of woman with one common body, yet 
concurrently offers a possible reality of women with different and individual heads and 
faces. The sharing of one body by many heads, or selves, reflects the concept of the 
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homogeneous feminine body, yet because idea O'Brien gives each manifestation of 
courage a different face she shows how the body functionally separates from feminine 
individuality. According to Green, Celtic statues or triple goddess figures are often 
depicted as wearing different hairstyles to support "the view that the goddesses were 
perceived as three separate entities" {Goddesses 111). The acknowledged courage is what 
Mary sees as Irish woman's intended lot for self-sacrifice. Additionally, the plaque 
explains that a previous body / statue was destroyed by vandals. This new effigy would 
not exist except for the destruction of the previous statue. The new body simply replaces 
the former, which experienced a violent destruction; the body is replaceable and 
essentially disposable. That the current plaque explains the violent end of the statue's 
predecessor begs the question of whether or not the previous figure had a plaque, and 
what it might have confessed regarding the statue's meaning or purpose. However, to 
address simultaneously the problem of the vandals' intolerance to a possibly existing but 
repressed truth heeds the contemporary issue of certain groups existing outside their 
actual physical reality or truth. The statement regards the closedness of the fractive and 
destructive patriarchal mindset and its inability to release any of its existing power to the 
marginalized faction. 
Shortly after her medical examination, Mary visits Mona, another Irish girl 
awaiting an abortion. Mona admits herself to be "a terrible woman" (O'Brien 129) who 
has no body apart from what is known by a masculine entity. She says of her boyfriend, 
"Gabriel can do anything he likes with me... He knows every bit of my body" (129). She 
equates his knowledge of her body with his ability and his right to act upon her body and 
thus allows his freedom to act as justifiable. LeMoncheck suggests a woman's sexuality 
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is often the "vehicle for her dehumanization" even if the masculine entity manipulating 
the vehicle is her intimate partner (104-5). She argues that there is no place safe from de-
humanization and homogenization for the purpose of women's oppression: 
Women are systematically dehumanized in the domestic sphere, the 
economic and the political spheres as well. And women are dehumanized 
psychologically so that they believe that their position as the social 
subordinates of men is either necessary, inevitable, deserved, or if the 
psychologizing is complete, right and best. (LeMoncheck 105) 
The notion of altering feminine insides leads to what Begona Aretxaga calls the 
"colonization of the female body" (131) and what Rosemary Radford Ruether calls the 
"colonization of women's wombs by the patriarchy" (Isherwood 75). Removing 
identifiers of individuality from women furthers the process of their homogenization with 
each other, which Aretxaga argues allows for the perpetuation of Irish women as "sluts" 
(133). Sexual devaluation of women by members of the power-wielding authority enables 
their ongoing verbal and sexual abuse because of their demoted status (133). In Down by 
the River, Donal complains about Mary and says, "Some little slut about to pour piss on 
the nation's breast" (O'Brien 167). According to Aretxaga, the continual sexual gaze and 
harassment issued by men, often who hold the advantage of military or religious 
authority, force women to learn to be "very skillful at ignoring both the words and their 
source" (131). These "concomitant feelings of embarrassment, degradation, and guilt" 
(132) inculcate woman functioning not as a subject defending her individuality, but as 
one existing within an automatic defence mechanism. She eventually both accepts the 
situation, and believes fully in the masculine authority. She is effectively the 
homogenized woman because she is consciously aware that the degradation and violation 
are not directed at her personally, but to her as a feminized object. 
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Aretxaga presents three documented cases of Irish male authority infringing upon 
a de-individualized woman's body. The level of violation and imposition, as well as the 
very lack of regard for feminine personal dignity, are apparent: 
The practice most feared by women is the strip search... A much 
publicized case concerned a thirteen-year-old girl, arrested during the 
night in 1978, who was obliged to stand with her menstrual blood running 
down her legs because she was denied a sanitary napkin. A case filed in 
1979 details the ordeal of a pregnant woman who was submitted, while 
under arrest, to three internal medical examinations without her consent 
and without substantiated reason. She was verbally abused about her 
sexuality and that of her family. In 1977 an eighteen-year-old woman was 
forcefully strip-searched while under arrest, tied to a table, and internally 
searched twice by a male soldier. These three women were released after a 
few days without charges. (132) 
Aretxaga's account not only represents blatant disregard for the person and criminalizes 
the medical exam, but also suggests, on the part of the interrogators, a right to explore 
within the woman's body. The chronicle calls forth images of men frantically trying to 
get inside the feminine body, or to get a look inside in order to control those insides. The 
patriarchy assumes a right to access the feminine body to explore and conquer. 
At this point, women are "only treated in ways similar to those things that lack 
human capacities" (Le Moncheck 33). Aretxaga soundly illustrates the de-humanization 
of Irish women as she depicts the "dirty protest" (135). In February 1980, prisoners at the 
Armagh Women's Prison joined the already ongoing dirty protest in which prisoners 
refused to leave their cells for fear of violence and personal rights violations; the women 
lived "surrounded by piss, menstrual blood and excrement" (135). Essentially, the 
prisoners were fighting with the very symbolic matter that created the patriarchal 
misogyny against them in the first place. According to Aretxaga, "[notions] of dirt and 
purity [were] crucial... in organizing ideas of savagery and civilization, establishing 
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social boundaries, and formulating cultural classifications" (135). It is through these 
types of distinctions that the "bodies of the working class and urban industrial spaces they 
inhabit became the epitome of dangerous and dirty animality" (135-6). The savage and 
impure women broke through the authoritative and institutional power boundaries and 
infected the patriarchate with filth. Aretxaga suggests that at this moment in Irish history, 
the feminine body became a weapon against the oppressive politics acting on women 
(136). 
However, feminine animalization and objedification—the body as a possible 
weapon—may actually serve to further the process of de-humanization. The women, 
covered in their own blood and feces, must have appeared overwhelmingly and 
exaggeratedly ambiguous; all their individual identifying features hidden beneath the 
disguising veil of filth preserve the doctrine of the authoritarian power labelling women 
as homogenous and impure, and as representative of both filth and flesh. Aretxaga 
suggests the protests represent "the crystallization of a conflict between prisoners' desire 
of mimetic violence against the guards and the need for restraint to preserve some 
physical and psychological integrity" (136). Yet, the irony remains that the body is the 
very space on which power functions in an authoritative institution, and it is the same tool 
used to overturn or alter that power. The dirty protest, which actually began in the male 
prison Long Kesh two years before the Armagh conflict, concluded with the onset of 
hunger strikes (Aretxaga 136). Prisoners fight the authority both with matter that comes 
out of the body and by matter that goes into the body. 
Aretxaga discusses the importance of menstrual blood in the dirty protests as 
highlighting the taboo in Irish Catholic culture that, on the level of perception, kept Irish 
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women as perpetual girls (139-40). She suggests that women's monthly cycles were the 
pivotal element that not only articulates the major gender differences between the 
women's and men's protests, but also excludes women from legitimate political 
militancy. For protests that were meant to be equal, the focus on menstruation at Armagh 
"shifted the meaning of the protest" (138) and transformed the "asexual bodies of girls 
into the sexualized bodies of women" (139), thus overturning established Irish 
idealization of femininity, motherhood and the image of Mother-Ireland (142). Also 
important, however, is the alienating property of menstrual blood. If considering all 
masculine experience as privileged and as definitive of humanity, the notion of feminine 
blood is the ultimate exclusion, and as such cannot represent humanity. Because 
menstrual blood does not fit in with male experience and is representative of the mystery 
of the 'other', it functions to further de-humanize women and their bodies. 
Existing so strictly as the 'other', society may not expect any women to behave 
counter to the feminine construct. O'Brien's Roisin initially seems to exist outside of the 
homogenized female because of her activity both politically, and outside of domestic 
Ireland. She travels to Rome, and O'Brien portrays her as a character of movement, and 
in some circles, authority and privilege. She initially appears to maintain agency as an 
extreme anti-abortion activist, but is in fact still a hollow feminine entity. Filled so 
completely with the "gospel she had come to spread" (O'Brien 23), Roisin argues very 
effectively each possible element of the debate as if memorized from her "leaflets" (23). 
Yet, she reiterates her own real experiences in only a shallow and "girlish" (22) manner 
or as it relates back to her own validation as speaking for the Church. She is an 
automaton reciting her constructed mantra, but is incapable of articulating that which 
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represents reality for a woman. "His Holiness had given her a sense of being right and on 
the right path and had implored her to spread the word of his Evangelicum Vitae" (22). 
The papal encyclicals Humanae Vitae (1968) and Evangelicum Vitae (1995) include 
complete prohibition of abortion regardless of the circumstances surrounding the 
pregnancy (Sjorup 83-4). While Roisin believes she instigates "good work" (O'Brien 24), 
she actually carries the patriarchal religious message that perpetuates the repression of the 
feminine body. She shows no depth of individual character on her own part; she even 
learns Italian only to accommodate communication with the Pope (22). Roisin becomes a 
sacrificial object (vessel) that symbolizes (carries) the abortion debate because her own 
conviction is unwavering and void of sympathetic humanity where "there can be no 
exceptions" (23). She unwittingly homogenizes all women into one group where the 
same answer fits all, and that answer is sacrifice. 
By placing Roisin as an extreme anti-abortion activist, O'Brien submits Roisin's 
identity to a common stereotype for women who, according to Leona English, work 
within the "regulating discourse" of Christianity and patriarchal control (97). In 
"Feminist Identities: Negotiations in the Third Space," English charts the complex 
identities of two women working for social development organizations. She asserts their 
identities are "changing, fluid, non-static, complicated and paradoxical" (98). While 
Roisin certainly appears paradoxical because she supports and preaches the discourse of 
the very system that oppresses her, she represents the opposite of English's identity 
dynamics and appears acutely static. Her militant focus on the prohibition of abortion 
overshadows any other possible identity for her. She falls squarely into the stereotype of 
which English warns. English suggests neither of her two subjects has "a monolithic 
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identity" (98). In Down by the River, however, O'Brien provides Roisin with no other 
character markers aside from her anti-abortion aggression. Roisin's one-track identity 
represents not a failure on O'Brien's part to develop her character fully, but instead 
symbolizes the failure of the Religious Right to perceive in women humanity and 
disambiguity. In an episode where Roisin makes an anti-abortion speech at Noni's home, 
her capacity as a religious rhetorician actually frightens the women attending to hear her 
speak (O'Brien 22). Her adamant and absolute stance reflects an atmosphere of a sort of 
automatic morality. Examples of exceptions—including rape or incest—are immediately 
disregarded. Roisin even suggests that women are not biologically capable of suicide 
because of a "hormone which stops them" (23). 
Any universal solution regarding reproductive rights, legislation, or even practice 
fundamentally manifests feminine debasement. In "The Vatican and Women's 
Reproductive Health and Rights: A Clash of Civilizations," Sjorup argues that the 
complete condemnation of abortion and certain forms of birth control, with disregard for 
the life of the mother, equates to a universalist "understanding of women" (87). She 
concludes, "the hierarchical power of the Catholic church is affirmed, while the women's 
needs for their very life, a reasonable burden of work, and bearable social circumstances 
are seen as sacrificial" (87). In Down by the River, Mrs Fitz complains, "[no] one's life is 
their own anymore" because "the State" and "the psychologists" hold power over 
everyone (O'Brien 208). The regularity of the element of possession in O'Brien's text 
elicits an atmosphere of not only colonial connection between individuals, but also the 
right to that connection. When James declares: "They have no right over her... She's my 
daughter... Let her come home and I'll mind her..." (O'Brien 192), he is proclaiming his 
105 
right to possess, and his right to treat Mary as he sees fit. The structure of community and 
of filial power demands a certain level of possession over children in order to perpetuate 
the strength of the family and ultimately, the community. The question remains if James 
is not the biological father of Mary, but a sort of surrogate, what happens to his right to 
possess? His lack of biological status ultimately compromises his masculine colonial 
position and his patriarchal right to power. Yet, by acting as father, he maintains his 
ability to exercise power. From a colonial standpoint, whether or not an individual or a 
group has a right to power—e.g., one country takes colonial possession of another—is of 
little consequence compared to the individual or group's ability to act out power on the 
'other'. In this case, successfully exercising power actually creates power. 
This notion of colonial possession and the exertion of power over specific groups 
or individuals mirrors back to the family. The very same colonial effect appears in the 
nuclear family because family structure is the basis of the hierarchies of communities. 
Ironically, the very social structure that adamantly demands the strength of the nuclear 
family, and by extension the banding together of family members as belonging to each 
other, disallows or discourages the notion of possession of others. Gibson argues that the 
"exclusive, possessive quality of family relationships involved in this conception of the 
[traditional] family also contributes to a view of children as the property of their parents" 
(66). The strong family unit receives social approval, but the necessary element of 
possession still belongs to the church and state that dictates as such. While perhaps 
socially misguided, when Roisin confronts Mary she is, in part, correct: 
'It's not your child,' she said suddenly to Mary. 'The way your tonsils are 
yours or your mane of hair.' 'It's not yours either,' Mary said, the words a 
beautiful explosion that seemed to float out of her mouth and blacken the 
face that was only inches away. (O'Brien 154) 
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Roisin will not allow Mary to take possession of her unborn baby, but she still attempts to 
assert some sort of ownership over the foetus, attributing possession to the church and the 
nation she represents. Yet, Mary's bold denial of national and religious possession 
represents the flaw in Roisin's despotic belief systems. Gibson addresses the issue of 
authoritarian possession: "Persons are not property; we are not the sorts of entities that 
can, morally speaking, be owned, even by ourselves. We are ourselves; we don't own 
ourselves" (74). Even in terms of a colonial or sovereign power, possession of the 
individual is illegitimate. If O'Brien denies James biological paternity, she effectively 
breaks down any authentic right to possess, whether it is colonial or filial. Yet, as 
suggested earlier, the ability to claim possession and demonstrate power over another 
person does not necessarily dictate an authentic right of power. Even though James may 
not be the biological father of Mary, he exercises his power over her through "conquest, 
colonization, and rape, and the employment of a traditional Irish poetic trope of the rape 
of the female land, by the male aggressor" (Romanets 140). Mary's rape mirrors Irish 
violation by English colonization. And, even though Ireland's independence was fully 
recognized by 1922, and links to the so-called colonial father were broken, the memory 
of Ireland as the intruded upon and raped symbolic child may persist. So, while Britain 
may attempt to represent himself as, the colonial father, he does not fit into any sort of 
nurturing role, but only into a violating and forceful one. Ireland, like Mary, is the bastard 
child of a patriarchal authority who takes on the image of father only to validate the 
paternal right to violate and exploit. Any lingering notions of colonial rights of 
possession ultimately reflect insecurities of paternity resulting from fatherhood's own 
natural dubiety and resulting in the importance of the symbolic child. 
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The symbolic child is important to both its parents, but for different reasons. In 
"The Gender of Generations," Rachel Muers writes about the possible ethical 
responsibility the maternal subject owes to future generations (311). If as Muers argues, 
the pregnant female body is a process or a system (machine), then the feminine entity and 
her system functions within "boundaries that are crossed, re-crossed and renegotiated" 
(317-8). The reification of the maternal situates her outside of any authoritative position. 
Yet, while Muers suggests she emphasizes the maternal and avoids the terms female and 
feminine, in order to avert the essentialist practice of equating all womanhood with 
motherhood (312), addressing the pregnant body as the social body is "often made to 
speak with the voice of the elite male" (318). Because the non-maternal feminine still 
generally possesses the potential for maternity, woman is either equally objectified or de-
feminized altogether. Even though responsibility to future generations rests with the 
processes and organized systems of the maternal body, the masculine, non-maternal 
remains authoritarian. This reaffirmation of patriarchal control through the feminine 
body—maternal or not—further universalizes the notion of the essential maternal 
feminine, regardless of Muers's attempts. Until the social feminine subject defines her 
own identity, the idea of the social maternal will encompass all of femininity. 
Just as the ambiguous pious female reaffirms the masculine religious order 
(Ruether, "Why" 234), the social maternal reaffirms and protects the patriarchal control 
for a homogenized future generation. According to Lisa Isherwood, identity perpetuation 
is not only a contemporary concern; it is the same dynamic that used the bodies of Eve 
and the Virgin Mary to dictate "the way women and their bodies would be treated under 
the Christian regime" (74). The cycle of possession is long-standing and serves to place 
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women in subordinate and auxiliary roles within heterosexual communities in order to 
emphasize the family. She suggests, "women's bodies are at the disposal of the 
patriarchal system from the factory floor to the bedroom, the paddy field to the labour 
ward" (73). She criticizes the patristic belief that the only purpose and just physical 
action for women is procreation, as well as the Fathers' rationalization of their control 
over women's bodies by a constructed history of feminine impurity and evil (75). 
Examples of witch trials, virgin cures, female self-mutilation for the purpose of eluding 
femininity and a general destructive power of the female body reinforce the vigour of the 
body politic. 
In The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir argues the virgin birth of Jesus is the 
catalyst for female subordination: "For the first time in human history the mother kneels 
before her son; she freely accepts her inferiority" (171). De Beauvoir outlines how, using 
the maternal body, religion has secured the "supreme masculine victory, consummated in 
the cult of the Virgin" (171). She suggests that the son's symbolic escape from the 
confines of the maternal body creates a dynamic which secures his powers and abolishes 
hers (171). Feminine subjugation functions through the myth of woman and the myth of 
the Virgin Mary in which the very idolization of a maternal woman places her as 
ambiguous and homogenous. The specifically gendered and often sinful body of the 
feminine entity, resulting from her ability to bear children, bears fully the weight of social 
meaning. 
In the introduction to The Location of Culture, Homi Bhabha quietly addresses 
the often-used oppositional gender dyad of the public and private spheres. He suggests 
that confining women to the domestic and "unseen" sphere not only secludes women and 
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restricts their access into the public domain, but also secludes the domestic sphere itself 
from visibility (10). According to Bhabha, this invisibility creates ambiguity, which, in 
turn, through the feminine body—what Bhabha calls the figure of the woman— 
dramatizes "the ambivalent structure of the civil states as it draws its rather paradoxical 
boundary between the private and the public spheres" (10). Privatizing the private sphere 
to such extreme degrees leads to cultural "forgetting" or "uncertainty" (10). In terms of 
patriarchal control over women, forgetting the very universalist ideals underpinning the 
patriarchal right to power consequently risks loss of power. As such, constructed gender 
myths easily replace these forgotten realities. Bhabha follows his critique of the public 
and private spheres with an observation that replacing the real with the imaginary leads to 
cultural and social ambiguity, or results in normalizing the domestic with the political 
(11), which from a colonial standpoint brings previously unrecognizable identity markers 
to light (12). These elements, seen by the patriarchy as foreign needs or ideas (12), are 
the feminine real overtaking the imaginary. The re-creation of the feminine entity or 
feminine self emerges by projecting reality, insofar as there is reality, in an imaginary 
culture. 
Immediately following her eviction from Luke's apartment by Mary-Lou, Mary 
attempts to hide out in a busy shopping mall. She is searching for anonymity in a crowd 
and she comes across a fish tank: "little tittlings, gaily coloured, gliding through their 
universe of water, feathered trees like so many curtains, and rockeries to shelter under" 
(O'Brien 102). O'Brien's references to curtains and rockeries exhibit not only Mary's 
desire to remain anonymous and hidden, but also represent notions of the domestic and 
the public respectively; she feels exposed and vulnerable, and is only moments later 
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apprehended by a Garda. She observes the small fish: "They were of every colour, silver 
and striped and pale yellow and jet black, the bodies like neon, allowing her to see the 
intestines within" (102). The wording of this sentence is interesting because the first part 
refers to the fish as 'they,' and the second part refers to the bodies of the fish, which 
implies a separation between the individuals—or group—and the bodies of those 
individuals. O'Brien provides an interesting juxtaposition between body articulation and 
the fish because their insides are visible through their bodies as if the inside is betrayed or 
confessed by the outside. The inside of any body is generally hidden from the 'other', but 
in this case, the outside of the body does nothing to protect the inside. Likewise, the 
feminine outer body slanders the feminine entity within by its false cultural articulation, 
as if their bodies are as transparent as the fish. A feminine body suffers cultural mis-
definition because society assumes that what is inside is articulated on the outside; 
society expects the feminine body is as transparent as the fish. These exposed insides, 
alongside Mary's subsequent capture, suggest the impending violence of exposing her 
own insides by the hand of her father. 
O'Brien's use of the feminine body functions to articulate the de-humanizing and 
hollowing efforts of the religious patriarchy to control Irish state policy and, 
consequently, the lives of its citizens. The unavoidable intertwining of religious praxis 
and the governing legislation forces the oppression of women as culturally necessary and 
compulsory for the on-going success of Ireland as a nationally sovereign body. O'Brien's 
practice of creating ambiguity between her feminine characters—human or animal— 
illustrates not only an intense corporeal homogenization, but also the requisite sacrifice of 
the feminine entity needed for the good of the family and the nation. 
I l l 
Conclusion 
"An Irish solution for an Irish problem..." 
Charles Haughey 
Denying the ability to exercise specific elements of social power to an individual 
makes the violent occupation of the body much less complicated. In Down by the River, 
the hollow feminine body exists only as devoid of power. Woman is necessarily hollow 
to accommodate the religious, political, and cultural impositions upon her as vessel. 
Society asks the individual feminine body to exist in the same way as all feminine bodies 
exist, resulting in consummate objectification. However, Mary MacNamara's resistance 
to this demand and her attempt at a somewhat revolutionary act—procuring an 
abortion—reflect the social flaw that mis-defines woman as vessel. Family and country 
impose a long-standing heritage of the Irish woman that defines her feminine body as not 
only a cultural carrying case, but also as "the highly idealized allegory of the nation" 
(Aretxaga 149). Further to the colonial imperative, woman, in this severely repressive 
state, soon submits and becomes acculturated to the very concepts that marginalize her. 
Simone de Beauvoir argues that because of the de-humanizing and de-
individualizing of the feminine entity by patriarchal social structures, the feminine body 
cannot "be a clear expression" of the actual feminine person (257). In Down by the River, 
the masculine 'other' violently imposes and forces the hollowing of Mary's body upon 
her, reminiscent of the procedures of Ireland's colonial history. Mary suffers real physical 
violence and injury by her father's hand, but an underlying element to the relationship is 
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an entrenched worldview that the masculine authority possesses a certain right over its 
related women and children. The masculine authority has emptied the feminine entity of 
her individuality and, as such, the patriarchy can possess the feminine body to use as it 
sees fit. 
Keane's work regarding the Irish woman in terms of the terrible devouring mother 
and the goddess of creation and destruction (xiv) outlines how the patriarchy constructs 
these myths of womanhood that link actual women to the nation and perpetuate the 
repression of the feminine body. For woman to be continually filled with the meaning of 
the 'other'—her husband, her child, or her country—distends her body with their cultural 
identities or social expectations. Because her roles are gendered, her existence is defined 
by her sexual status or her abstinence from it: 
.. .in every sexual act the Other is implicated; and the Other most often 
wears the visage of woman. With her, man senses most definitely the 
passivity of his own flesh. Woman is vampire, she eats and drinks him; 
her organ feeds gluttonously upon his. (de Beauvoir 168) 
Limiting woman's identity roles to a feminine trinity of virgin, mother, or whore is to 
construct gendered boundaries within which women are contained; these boundaries 
ultimately de-individualize and consequently de-humanize woman, and limit her 
existence to being a restricted gendered entity based on her physical body. She sacrifices 
her internal identity needs and her personal potential for the needs of her family and her 
country. Her devouring nature, in part, is self-destructive because it devours, through 
self-sacrifice, her potential for self; no actual feminine self exists. Her self is the other. 
Women embody both sacrifice and guilt because they "are made only deficiently in the 
image of God, and are ultimately a symbol of evil and of dependent, sinful humanity" 
(Schaberg 81). Ultimately, because the embodiment of God is masculine, women are 
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inherently deficient. Any action by traditionally inactive or docile female characters—an 
abortion or a visit to a sacred shrine—are attempts only "to erase the evidence of... [this] 
'guilt'" (Sachdev 171). In Down by the River, privacy over matters of moral impurity is 
the ultimate goal for women in order to maintain the social purity of their families. 
O'Brien provides complete protection of the masculine powers by the deaths of specific 
male characters, placing the burden of guilt squarely on the feminine bodies. Both Mr 
Crowe's and James's suicides by drowning and hanging respectively, remove the male 
authorities—regardless of their guilt or innocence—from the social spectrum and as such 
submit their feminine relatives to the stigma and taboo of procreative guilt. 
O'Brien's women are similarly homogenized to the point of anonymity. As a 
cultural object, the feminine body cannot function as anything but divided from her self 
because any woman is any other woman. Her feminization, defined and divided by her 
masculine counterpart, thus forsakes her own identity. She is viewed "as All; once more 
all under the form of the Other, All except herself (de Beauvoir 237). She cannot be 
individual because woman does not inherently possess individuality; she possesses only 
that element of which is woman, and is consequently "deprived of her human position" 
(236). Feminine creation is mythical and imaginary. O'Brien connects the conflict of 
woman to both the Virgin Mary and Mary Magdalene. Symbolic variations between the 
two religious figures suggest that the dichotomy of woman is not, after all, so black and 
white. The concept that a woman, such as O'Brien's Mary and other female characters, 
may actually possess differing and even contradictory elements illustrates a new option 
for O'Brien's women. While they do have to live within this ambiguous dyad, O'Brien 
suggests that the masculine constructs are at odds with a natural identity tendency for 
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women. Any defining system to place woman as either virgin or fallen woman does not 
allow for feminine self-determination or agency. Thus, the feminine body is now separate 
and divided from the feminine soul or identity. 
Like in the much-publicized case of X, Mary's body is restricted within a specific 
geography. In order to maintain and progress the masculine and religious colonization of 
the female body, her power and authority over her own body must be diminished. By 
categorizing woman's body as possession, both state and religion are able to freely indict 
against individual women's freedoms, and indict for her feminine insides, which 
ultimately act as carrier for the conservation of existing political and religious systems. 
The patriarchal paradigm privileges the "right to life of the unborn" (O'Reilly 128) over 
the existing mother, as for Mary and X, who are themselves still children (131). The 
marginalization of woman here is an explicit favouring of the 'other' over the woman's 
own existence. O'Reilly quotes a psychologist in the X case as saying: 
.. .the ruling effectively confirmed that 'the foetus takes absolute 
precedence over the life of the mother' [and further] .. .accused the judge 
of having simply and unambiguously placed the right to life of the unborn 
and the right to life of the woman on a legal scales, weighted them, and 
found in favour of the unborn. (133) 
Conflict between the inside and the outside of the feminine body generally leans toward 
favouring of the inside, insomuch as it does not belong to the individual herself. For 
society, that carried by the feminine vessel matters so much more than the vessel itself. 
The highly political and much-publicized abortion debates in Ireland aligned with 
O'Brien's hollow feminine illustrate the patriarchal and colonial inclination to 
marginalize and control women as if they are possessions to both country and to religion. 
The colonized condition of women parallels the former colonial situation of Ireland 
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herself and as such cannot allow any slippage of that control and authority. For culture to 
designate women into spaces of oppression and further to decree in them self-revulsion, 
progresses the gendered power imbalances and creates opportunities to preserve the 
existing structure and political worldview. So, even though Mary travels to England for 
an abortion, the very fact that she ultimately does not need to make that final decision 
suggests a level of resigned conflict; for Mary, O'Brien provides an Irish solution to an 
Irish problem. 
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Appendix 1 
Please find copies of Legislation, Acts, or Constitutional Amendments specific to this 
thesis at the following addresses: 
Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution (Eighth Amendment, 1983) 
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/ei00000_.html 
No. 20/1979 Health (Family Planning) Act, 1979 
http://acts.oireachtas.ei/print/zza20y 1979.1 .html 
Abortion Act, 1967 (United Kingdom) Chapter 87 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts 1967/pdf/ukpgal 9670087_en.pdf 
Offences Against the Person Act, 1861 (United Kingdom) 
Revised Statute from the UK Statute Law Database 
See Attempts to Procure an Abortion Parts 58 and 59 
http://www.opsi.gov.Uk/RevisedStatutes/Acts/ukpga/l 86 l/cukpga_l 86101 OOenl 
Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/RevisedStatutes/Acts/ukpga/1929/cukpga_19290034_en_l 
For other related Amendments see: 
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/attached_files/html%20files/Constitution%20ofd/o20Ireland 
%20(Eng)Nov2004.htm 
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